Daily Report

East Europe

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FBIS-EEU-91-249 *27 December 1991*

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EC Signs Treaties With Poland, Hungary, CSFR

AU2012135991 Warsaw PAP in English
2049 GMT 16 Dec 91

[Text] Brussels, Dec. 16—Poland and the European Communities (EC) signed a treaty on Poland's association with the EC in Brussels Monday. On behalf of Poland, the treaty was signed by Acting Prime Minister Leszek Balcerowicz and on behalf of the EC by President of its Council of Ministers and Dutch Foreign Minister Hans van den Broek, Vice-President of the EC Commission (executive body) Frans Andriessen, responsible for external relations, and foreign ministers (or their plenipotentiaries) of the 12 EC member states.

At the same time, the treaties on association with the EC were signed on behalf of Hungary and Czecho-Slovakia by Prime Ministers Jozsef Antall and Marian Calfa.

Leszek Balcerowicz said during the ceremony of signing the three treaties that this was a turning point not only for the three future states associated with the EC but also for the twelve states themselves and for the future of entire Europe as the "process of integration of Western Europe exceeds its borders today."

Balcerowicz went on to say that the "document signed today is the result of a compromise and we believe that it is beneficial both to Poland and the EC. For us, the agreement is the beginning of the road to the full EC membership. We are aware that hard work and many preparations are in store for us but it is a goal which we will not give up."

President of the EC Commission Jacques Delors, present at the ceremony, stressed that "association expresses the EC's full determination to help the three states continue their double march towards deepening democracy and modernizing economy, requiring great effort."

Asked by the PAP correspondent during a brief press conference after signing the association treaty whether it provided sufficiently broad frameworks to enable Poland to remove its distance from the EC in the future, Balcerowicz stressed that the agreement "will help us go through the painful process of restructuring by better access to the EC market and by attracting foreign capital."

Balcerowicz added that "it is also very important that the EC supports this process by financial and technical assistance." He voiced hope that "by closely cooperating with one another the associated states and the EC will continue the process of rapprochement that will end after some time in full integration of the three states with the EC."

The ceremony of signing the treaty was delayed by an hour because of the objections to importing steel from central Europe, raised by the Spaniards at the last moment.

During the same ceremony, the Polish, Hungarian and the Czechoslovak foreign ministers and the EC representatives signed agreements on a provisional coming into force of the commercial part of the association treaties as of March 1, 1992.

As long as the parliaments of all states concerned and the European Parliament do not ratify the entire treaties, they will not entirely come into force from the start of 1993.

Government Recognizes Russia, Other Republics

AU2712103891 Tirana ATA in English 0902 GMT 27 Dec 91

["Statement of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, December 27 (ATA)—The speedy and deep changes in the former USSR led to the interruption of the existence of this multinational state built up on the basis of the 1922 treaty of the Union and to the creation of the independent states community with 11 republics participating in it until now.

The Republic of Albania hails these progressive processes. Proceeding from its desire to see that the right of every people to self-determination be realised in practice, it is convinced that through a good political will, in the spirit of confidence and understanding, peaceful, democratic and acceptable solutions be found for all the parties, however complicated the problems.

Certainly these developments will contribute to the peace process and security in Europe and in the world. At the same time we hope that the participating states in the community will stand loyal to the national and international committments.

Proceeding from these principles the Republic of Albania will recognize the Russian republic as well as the other republics participating in the independent states community and will establish diplomatic relations with them.

Marku Regrets Greek 'Campaign' Against Albanians

AU2712104491 Tirana ATA in English 0950 GMT 27 Dec 91

["Albania Is Interested To Have Good Relations With Greece and With Every Neighbouring Country—Interview of the Foreign Deputy Minister Mehill Marku With the Albanian Radiotelevision"—ATA headline]

[Text] Tirana, December 27 (ATA)—On December 26, deputy foreign minister of Albania, Mr. Mehill Marku, had an interview with the radiotelevison with regard to the actual relations with Greece and other neighbouring countries. He said among others:

Recently an unprecedented campaign is launched against the Albanians being actually in Greece on employment or health grounds. As a pretext for the campaign serves the fact that certain individuals have committeed various crimes. This fact is not an argument to undertake a campaign against thousands of Albanians to oust them with force, to maltreat them as animals and to return them home. In the interstate relations it is normal to cooperate in this field, to find out the possible ways and solutions. The Albanian Government has continuously voiced the readiness to develop cooperation in the field of criminality. On this occasion I would like to remind the Greek opinion that during the civil war thousands of Greeks came to Albania and the Albanian people although in very difficult conditions did not only [not] maltreat them, not only did not expel them through force, but on the contrary they sheltered them, maintained them in their homes. Whereas now, the Albanian people are faced with such a campaign for which one should be worried.

This campaign in Greece against the Albanian, the so-called "the broom" operation runs counter to all the current tendencies to calm down the hearth of tension wherever in Europe.

It is a fact that certain circles in Greece are working against the relations between Albania and Greece. Albania has continuously underlined that it is for friendly relations, it wants to establish good relations with Greece, proceeding from the fact that for centuries we have coexisted beside each other without waging any war.

Under the current circumstances of the establishment of democracy, the Albanian people can never forget history, it can ever forget even the claims which appear from time to time, it can never forget the campaign being carried out in Greece by certain circles, which have gone so far as to ask for the independence of the so-called Vorioepirus. Naturally these are claims which can not be accepted by the current world public opinion, by no European state, by no genuine democratic country.

We have many problems to discuss with Greece, problems inherited from the past. Here it is about problem of [word indistinct] and their assets in Greece. Under the conditions of democracy it is quite normal that two states discuss for something. I want to stress once again that we are searching for a sincere dialogue with the Greek party, to discuss with it on all the problems concerning us.

Regarding the other neighbouring countries too Albania has constantly pursued a policy of maintaining relations, confidence and understanding. The relations with Italy have developed quite well. We rejoice over the fact of having understanding with the Italian party. We support and rejoice over the aid the Italian Government has offered aids to Albania. [sentence as received] We hope that in the future too the relations with Italy will continue to be good and we are sure of this. Whereas concerning Yugoslavia I want to say that our relations do not exist, as long as there does not exist even a state called Yugoslavia.

Property Confiscation Act Taking Effect

AU2412122491 Sofia BTA in English 1145 GMT 24 Dec 91

[Text] Sofia, December 24 (BTA)—The act on the reversion to the state of property illegally acquired at the time of totalitarianism by the Socialist, formerly Communist, Party and its satellites has taken effect.

Before the end of this year the Supreme Leadership of the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] will move out of the massive building in the centre of Sofia housing its headquarters, it became known at yesterday's press conference of the BSP.

The Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (CITUB)—successor to the former state-controlled trade union organization, also comes under the property reversion act. At yesterday's briefing CITUB Vice President Diana Damyanova described the act as "antitrade union." According to her the opinion expressed by trade union leaders of France, Belgium and Luxembourg she consulted is unambiguous: In the conditions of unity of action between the CITUB and the Podkrepa Labor Confederation such an act is unthinkable. The independent trade unions received solidarity-expressing cables from the International Trade Union Rights Center, the General Confederation of Trade Unions in Russia, the Federation of Independent Trade Unions in the Ukraine, the Federation of Trade unions in Belorussia, the Trade Unions of Kazakhstan .

Yesterday the CITUB suggested to Podkrepa to hold joint actions pressing parliament and the government into "finding a specific legislative solution by allowing the two trade union organizations to become owners of the property acquired by their members."

Podkrepa, however, declined the proposal. It will not support the strike declared by the CITUB on January 8, either. Podkrepa maintains that though there is a good reason for the strike, it is motivated by considerations inherited from the past for which the present government cannot be responsible either morally or legally.

Today's "PODKREPA" paper writes that "the confiscation of the property of totalitarian organizations should start immediately." Podkrepa's Confederative Council holds the opinion that besides the BSP, the successors to the Dimitrov Young Communist League, the state-controlled trade unions, the Fatherland Front, the Union of Fighters against Fascism and Capitalism, scores of other organizations which have unambiguously proved to be of totalitarian nature and which were used by the communist nomenklatura as a cover for hiding the property robbed from the Bulgarian people, should also be included in the confiscation list. "'PODKREPA' condemns all attempts at sharing property and funds," reads the statement made by Podkrepa's Confederative Council published in today's issue of "PODKREPA."

Maxwell Relations With Secret Service Detailed

AU2412140091 Sofia BTA in English 1326 GMT 24 Dec 91

[Text] Sofia, December 24 (BTA)—Mr. Robert Maxwell collaborated with the Bulgarian Secret Services, the "168 CHASA" weekly writes today. The scandalous feature based on a 1987 memorandum mentions the names of ex-Prime Minister Andrey Lukanov, ex-Deputy Prime Minister Georgi Pirinski and other figures from the former higher echelon of power.

The memorandum bears the approval of Todor Zhivkov. It sets forth the possibilities for the import of machines and equipment falling under the COCOM ban through the establishment of consortiums with the industrialized states. The memorandum says that "a principled agreement has been reached with Mr. Maxwell on the establishment of joint ventures in Britain and Western Europe. The daily writes that another document marked "top secret," issued in a single copy and then triplicated, orders the Bulgarian Secret Services to "coordinate and control the money flow abroad and render assistance for the fulfillment of the project." The hard currency receipts from those companies were supposed to be stored in bank accounts abroad under the control of the Ministry of the Interior.

The memorandum was worked out by Mr. Ognyan Doynov, then deputy prime minister and member of Politburo of the Bulgarian Communist Party, Mr. Stoyan Markov, then alternate member of Politburo and chairman of the State Committee for Research and Technologies, and by Mr. Khristo Khristov, the then minister of trade. After the unseating of Todor Zhivkov, Mr. Doynov became a consultant with Mr. Maxwell's company, while Mr. Markov and Mr. Khristov own prosperous businesses, writes the weekly.

The document bearing Todor Zhivkov's blessing develops in detail mechanisms for the transfer of capital between different firms and bank holding companies, money laundering abroad and in Bulgaria. The Bulgarian participation was supposed to be effected through holding companies in Switzerland, Austria and other countries.

Through a resolution of the so-called Party-Cum-State Commission on Science and Technology dated January 19, 1987 a 100,000 dollar fund was established for the financing of the project. On February 10, 1987 Mr. Doynov offered the cabinet to include it in the foreign currency earnings plan. Through a Government Resolution Nr. 17 of February 19, 1987, signed by Mr. Andrey Lukanov, a special trade department was established with the Ministry of Foreign Trade. It was headed by Mr. Georgi Pirinski. Foreign trade organizations like Technomatimpex and Technocommerce were set up to handle the secret operations. Other Bulgarian foreign trade organizations were involved in them as well.

Mr. Mikhail Bozarov, Todor Zhivkov's nephew, was responsible for the whole project, as for the similar previous projects named Monblan and Neva. He was president of the Insist Company which was to coordinate the project, writes "168 CHASA."

Thousands of millions of dollars [as received] were spent on the purchase of totally useless equipment from Western companies, thus providing the secret financing of the true deals for intellectual property and products on the COCOM lists, the purchase of some foreign companies or of stakes in others. Some of the newly established companies were involved in illegal trade in arms and medicines under the control of the World Health Organization.

The joint ventures with Mr. Maxwell as well as other Bulgarian companies abroad were of two different types. In some of them the Bulgarian side had the casting vote, while the others were only bearing dividends, like Baimex, a joint venture with Mr. Maxwell, for example. It is unclear who actually owns that company: The state or its former representatives, most of them former state security employees. The weekly quotes a recent statement of the former minister of foreign economic relations, Mr. Atanas Paparizov, who said that the Bulgarian companies abroad and those with direct or indirect Bulgarian participation (395 in number) fall out of the government's control. For 58 of them it has been proved that they are under state security control.

One of the main shareholders in the partnerships with Mr. Maxwell is the Industrial Association, now Chamber of Commerce, which was founded by Mr. Ognyan Doynov. The activity of Mr. Maxwell's partners, apart from the Bank for Agricultural Credit, includes a 1985 classified framework agreement on cooperation between the British Printing and Communication Corporation and a group of Bulgarian companies (whose names are not mentioned in the weekly), a joint venture (50:50, Baimex-style) between Maxwell and the Interhotels Travel Agency, the joint ventures Sims and Informa, the Bulgarian National Film Corporation, Bulgarian Yellow Pages and the Bulgarian-British Association.

The still unpublished white book concerning the activities of the former State Security writes that the economic result of those activities exceeds 1,000 million dollars, "168 CHASA" writes. The white book also notes that "secret transit trade was the official state policy," reads the article in "168 CHASA."

Plovdiv Bus Drivers End Strike

AU2612142291 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Today the strike of the public transportation drivers in Plovdiv ended with success. After the public transportation in Plovdiv had been paralyzed for two days, the municipality gave in and reached an agreement with the strikers.

The starting pay for drivers of articulated buses will now be 1,450 leva, which is 100 leva less than the rate paid to the drivers in Sofia.

Havel Thanks Gorbachev for Contributions

LD2612175391 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Vaclav Havel, the Czechoslovak president, today sent a telegram to Mikhail Gorbachev in which he thanked him for his merits in pushing through the policy of democratization and perestroyka in the former Soviet Union. By this you have helped many, he says in the telegram, and above all the people of your country, which, thanks to your initiative, have begun to undergo a transformation from a colonial empire into a commonwealth of free and independent states.

You have also helped us, Czechoslovakia and other countries of Central Europe, to extricate ourselves from the position of satellites that were not allowed to manage their own affairs and thereby to regain our freedom, sovereignty, and independence. You have helped the whole world put an end to the cold war and end the arms race, he went on in his telegram. Closing, Vaclav Havel wished Mikhail Gorbachev good health and happiness in his private life and the people of the Commonwealth of Independent States many successes along the road to democracy and prosperity.

Commonwealth Republics' Independence Recognized

LD2612174791 Prague Stanice Ceskoslovensko Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] The Government of the Czech and Slovak Federative Republic welcomes the establishment of the Commonwealth of Independent States and the independence of the republics which came into existence out of the former Soviet Union. The government recognizes that the executor of international laws and the successor to the former Soviet Union in international organizations, including the United Nations and the Security Council, is the Russian Federation. The Czechoslovak representative office in Moscow is, as of today, the Embassy of Czechoslovakia in Russia. The Czechoslovak Government, which has recognized the independence of Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus is ready to recognize other new states and hold talks with them about conditions of cooperation and the establishment of diplomatic relations.

Dienstbier on Treaties With Commonwealth Nations

LD2612214991 Prague CSTK in English 1943 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 26 (CSTK)—The treaty which had been prepared between Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union will not be automatically taken over by the Russian Federation, Czechoslovak Foreign Minister Jiri Dienstbier said on Czechoslovak Television tonight.

The aim of the prepared treaty was to "overcome the old one which anchored the Brezhnev Doctrine on the basis of which Czechoslovakia was occupied in fact", he said, adding that now Czechoslovakia will prepare treaties with Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and other republics.

Dienstbier said a Czechoslovak delegation is to visit the republics of the former Soviet Union already at the beginning of 1992 to discuss security issues, as well as gas and oil supplies.

Draft Plan Would Allow Soviet Troop Transit

AU2412122091 Prague CSTK in English 1643 GMT 20 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 20 (CSTK)—Soviet soldiers returning to former Soviet republics from Germany will be able to travel through Czechoslovakia if a draft agreement completed here Thursday in talks between Czechoslovak and Soviet representatives is approved by both Czechoslovakia and the post-Soviet republics.

Officials from the Czechoslovak Ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Transportation, and other federal bodies, met with Soviet military transportation officials and representatives from the Ukraine to work out the draft intergovernmental agreement.

Czechoslovak Transportation Ministry spokesman Frantisek Spicak told CSTK the draft agreement would be presented for consideration to the Federal and Republic Governments. It must also be approved by the Federal Assembly (parliament) before taking effect.

Finance Minister Reviews Successes, Failures

LD2612172591 Prague Stanice Praha Radio Network in Czech 1730 GMT 25 Dec 91

[Interview with Vaclav Klaus, federal deputy prime minister and finance minister, by unidentified correspondent; date and place not given]

[Text] [Correspondent] Six days remain until the end of the current year. Apart from celebrating Christmas this period also provides an opportunity for taking stock, assessing successes and failures, and making forecasts for the months ahead. I have requested Vaclav Klaus, federal deputy prime minister and finance minister, to do just this regarding our economy. Let us therefore hear what has pleased the main strategist of our economy and what has not during the past months.

[Begin recording] [Klaus] I think there have been more things that have pleased me than things that have not. This is the basic attitude I would like to articulate. What has been gladdening is the fact that despite everything we have, in essence, succeeded in the first year in turning our economic system around radically. The issue is not that we would have preferred the prices rising a bit less, output declining a bit less, if there had been a smaller number of insolvent enterprises—yes, we would have preferred all of this—but the radical change that has occurred and our crossing the Rubicon from one world to another has taken place to a considerable degree

successfully in 1991. The accompanying shock has not been so infinitely large. On the positive side, this in any case is a precious thing.

One could undoubtedly find things on the negative side but I would not call them gross failures. Some things could have been done earlier; others could have been done more calmly. Certain things could have been achieved earlier by reaching an agreement and without aggravating the situation. If one analyzed such things the day after they happened one could naturally find a great many such instances but I believe that they have not influenced the basic trend. Of course, they added to the disquiet; they added greater burden; they meant that the government had to hold more meetings at 2200 in the evening or on Sundays than it necessarily had to, and one could go on. I believe however that the principle is correct.

The liberalization jump was really a jump into uncharted territory. We simply did not know whether we would hit harder or softer ground or even a mire into which we would sink further. That jump was a risk for all of us and I believe that it ended well.

[Correspondent] Could one say about this year that since its end was a good one everything was good? After all, the parliament, which had already been written off, passed the budget and banking laws. It is apparent that 1992 will reach the bottom of the transformation process. How are we going to feel this bottom?

[Klaus] I would like to say first of all that I do not use the term: written off parliament. We are simply what we are. Everyone complains that our managers are not like those in the back of beyond. [as heard] They simply are not. Our deputies are as we elected them and if there were better ones avaliable they should have been sitting in the parliament. Everyone had an opportunity to get involved in those first months of 1990. I therefore do not use the words written off parliament, and it is this that I would like to say: I believe that the end of this year in the parliament was a big success for reason; it was a big success for the reform concept; it was a big success that a responsible attitude prevailed over the attitude often prevailing in the media, which makes the situation frequently far more frightening than it is in reality. It was therefore a big success and this is also how I interpret it.

And now to 1992. If 1991 was a year of relaxation, liberalization, and deregulation, when matters depended more and more on every one of us whether one sits at the ministry or 300 and 500 km from Prague, then 1992 will be dominated by the privatization trend. It will be a year in which the umbilical cords will be severed between individual enterprises, whether they be small, large, or super-large on the one side and the state on the other side. This will provide an impulse to a radical change in behavior. We have experienced the severing of umbilical cords already this year when privatizing very small enterprises such as shops and the like. We have experienced problems but we have also been able to see a very beneficial affect this has overall brought about. The year 1992 will therefore be one when enterprises will have to stand on their own feet and this will lead to different behavior and enterprises will have to adapt themselves to the new situation. This will undoubtedly bring its positive economic effects since enterprises will have to behave better. It will however also bring negative ones. Enterprises will have to begin to think more about costs, about what they can afford to pay, whether they can have so many employees or whether they can do with a smaller number. This process of adaptation will be such that it will affect some of us, for within the framework of this process not everyone will be a winner, although we as a whole should be winners. [end recording]

Nuclear Research Group Grants CSFR Membership

LD2512045491 Prague CSTK in English
1312 GMT 23 Dec 91

[Text] Geneva Dec 23 (CSTK)—Although many states including Hungary, Turkey and Israel have applied for membership of the European Organisation for Nuclear Research (CERN), Czechoslovakia was given priority, Czechoslovak Deputy Foreign Minister Zdenko Pirek told CSTK today. The CERN council decided on Czechoslovakia's admission to the world's second biggest research centre December 20. The CERN is interested mainly in the "Skoda Plzen" engineering enterprise, west Bohemia, Pirko said.

Assembly Chamber Approves Law on Banks

AU2412122291 Prague CSTK in English
1715 GMT 20 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 20 (CSTK)— The House of Nations of the Federal Assembly today approved government bills on the State Bank of Czechoslovakia and on banks.

At a joint meeting on December 12 the House of Nations and the House of The People failed to adopt a resolution on the bills.

Officials Listed in Secret Police Files

AU2412122191 Prague CSTK in English
1237 GMT 20 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 20 (CSTK)—The Czech parliament Screening Commission told the legislators' 29th session today that 63 deputies, Czech Government officials and judiciary staffers are listed in the registers of the former Secret Police (StB).

Since November 6, the commission has established collaboration with the StB in five cases.

The screening law, passed by the Czechoslovak parliament in October, bars former leading communist officials, StB collaborators and members of the people's militia from holding public posts in the next five years.

The commission also screened Bedrich Moldan, Czech environment minister from January 1, 1990 to January 24, 1991, who had to resign due to alleged collaboration with the StB. The commission said that Moldan had been registered in the StB files but did not find any evidence proving his collaboration with the StB.

Prosecutor Wants Names Published

AU2612135291

[Editorial Report] Czech newspapers on 21 December publish a number of items concerning the circulation of lists of collaborators of the former State Security Corps (StB) in Czechoslovakia.

Prague CESKE A MORAVSKOSLEZSKE ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 21 December on page 2 carries a 300-word "iko"-signed report entitled "104 With the Stigma of Confidential Collaborators." The report states that, following the release of a list of 80 confidential collaborators of the former StB earlier in December, on 20 December the Anti-Communist Alliance (AA) issued the second installment of this list, which is said to contain "another 24 names from the ranks of journalists, scientists, diplomats, and the like."

The ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY report goes on to say: "The AA refuses to divulge the source of its data and to say how many more such lists it has prepared. According to the AA, the names of StB members themselves will also be published. In the opinion of the AA, the screening law is not good, which is why it took the matter into its own hands. It does not concede the possibility of error in its data."

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 21 December on page 3 carries a 300-word statement by Ludvik Brunner, prosecutor general of the Czech Republic. In the statement Brunner advocates the "publication of the names of all registered StB collaborators." The reason for his advocacy of this move, he says, is the publication of the AA list. As Brunner points out, "it cannot be ruled out that included in the circulating lists may also be names not entered in the StB registers. This may be motivated by political considerations, the desire for revenge, or other reasons. Making public the lists of real StB collaborators would prevent the tarnishing of innocent people." The second reason, Brunner continues, "is that links stemming from cooperation with the former StB continue and have only been shifted from the political sphere to the economic sphere." Moreover, according to Brunner, the publication of all names of StB collaborators would also "prevent the misuse of information, which need not even be false, in the election campaign" to "morally eliminate potential political adversaries."

The publication of the AA list is also the subject of commentaries in Prague LIDOVE NOVINY and Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 21 December.

Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech on 21 December on page 1 carries a 400-word Jan Urban commentary, entitled "Dirt." Urban criticizes the fact that "there exists no legal norm that would determine the method of dealing with the StB's dirtiest legacy"—information on individual citizens which the StB acquired by illegal means—and he challenges the Interior Ministry's right to own and dispose of this material. Urban says: "Which law guarantees that there really exists no danger of this material being abused? There are only two solutions that a democratic state can afford. The first solution would be to make illegible the names of other persons and hand out the material to those whom it was intended to compromise. However, the most democratic and courageous way would be to take all materials about citizens gained illegally by the state and destroy them under the parliament's supervision."

Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech on 21 December on page 2 carries a 600-word Ondrej Neff commentary entitled "Let Us Return to the Law." Commenting on the publication of alleged lists of StB collaborators by the AA, Neff says: "It is inadmissible for anyone to arbitrarily take the application of the screening law in his own hands. However pure his intentions may be, his deeds result in disparaging the legal system, one of the pillars on which democracy rests."

Miklosko Interviewed on Developments in Slovakia

AU2712105191 Prague CSTK in English 0754 GMT 23 Dec 91

[Text] Bratislava—Slovak National Council (parliament) Chairman Frantisek Miklosko said in today's Slovak independent daily "NARODNA OBRODA" the parliament held its ground in this dramatic autumn. There was a threat of a Slovak Government crisis almost at its every session, he said, adding that a crisis was threatening the whole Czechoslovakia as well.

According to Miklosko, early elections will not be held. He said there will not be a political party to win an overwhelming majority in the June 1992 parliamentary elections. Neither will it be easy to create a coalition based on a consensus of political programs or representatives, Miklosko stressed.

New Trade Union Formed in Bratislava

LD2612200691 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] A constituent congress of the Christian Trade Union of Slovakia was held in Bratislava today. Delegates elected Dusan Mihalik from Dubnica nad Vahom as the chairman of their trade union. They also discussed the program and orientation of Christian Trade Union of Slovakia.

New Youth Council Constituted in Czech Republic

AU2512141991 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 19 Dec 91 p 2

[CSTK report: "Council of Youth"]

[Text] A new children's and youth organization, the Council of Youth from Bohemia, Moravia, and Silesia [Rada Mladeze Cech, Moravy a Slezska], has been founded by 28 organizations, i.e. approximately two-thirds of the recently dissolved Czech Republic Youth Council. As the chairman of the new council, young Social Democrat Stanislav Gross, said at yesterday's news conference, some organizations have allegedly blocked the Czech Republic Youth Council's operation. For example, the new association does not include the Union of Youth (the successor to the Union of Socialist Youth), Pioneers, or even the Brontosaurus movement. Stanislav Gross admitted that a paradoxical situation could occur in which two councils would compete for the right of succession.

Germans Said To Obtain Chairmanship for Hradska

AU2512142291 Prague LIDOVE NOVINY in Czech 21 Dec 91 p 3

[CSTK report: "German Intrigues"]

[Text] Prague—"Massive pressure by German liberals" was the reason the Liberal Democratic Party proposed Viktorie Hradska for the post of party chairman. The former Liberal Democratic Party leadership headed by Emanuel Mandler learned, however, that Hradska is deviating from the liberal line of the party toward "the ideology of the velvet revolution," and therefore it proposed the then-Chairman Mandler as a counter-candidate. This is how the former chief of the party, Federal Assembly Deputy Emanuel Mandler explained the internal crisis in the Liberal Democratic Party. He said that German liberals—in addition to other occasions, during visits of Hans-Dietrich Genscher—endeavored to affiliate the Liberal Democratic Party with the Civic Movement. According to Mandler, the Free Democratic Party [FDP] made it obvious that it will support the Liberal Democratic Party as long as Hradska is the chairman. Now the former chairman is working for an early party conference, at which a new party chairman elections would take place. He himself will not run in the election.

Gabal To Head Civic Movement Election Campaign

AU2512142491 Bratislava SMENA in Slovak 21 Dec 91 p 2

[CSTK report: "Gabal is the Chief"]

[Text] Ivan Gabal, who has until now held the post of head of the Center for Political Analysis at the Chancellery of the President of the Republic, will be the Civic Movement's chief of the 1992 parliamentary election campaign. Civic Movement Secretary Lubor Kinst announced this to reporters in Prague yesterday. He said that President Vaclav Havel complied several days ago with the appeal by Civic Movement Chairman Jiri Dienstbier asking for the release of Ivan Gabal from his post at Prague Castle.

Communique Recognizes CIS, Praises Gorbachev

LD2612180191 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] At the beginning of our program, we report on the Hungarian Government communique analyzing the situation following the resignation of Gorbachev, the Soviet president. Our homeland recognizes the Commonwealth of Independent States, and is ready to establish diplomatic relations with the sovereign states within the shortest period of time—this is contained in a government communique published today. In the document, the government greets the purposeful and responsible politics of the leaders of the successor states, with which they created the indispensible conditions for the peaceful and democratic transformation of the Soviet Union. In the process, Russian President Boris Yeltsin played a determining role. The communique also praises the role of Mikhail Gorbachev, emphasizing that on an area covering one-sixth of the world, the totalitarian regime ceased and a peaceful transition took place in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. The Hungarian Government greatly appreciates the political wisdom and dignity with which President Gorbachev, following the transformation of the Soviet Union, voluntarily left his post, leaving the way free for further democratic changes, says the communique.

Further on Communique

LD2612204691 Budapest MTI in English 1929 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 26 (MTI)—The Republic of Hungary recognizes the Commonwealth of Independent States formed at the Alma-Ata conference 21 December. Hungary is ready to establish diplomatic ties with the sovereign states as soon as possible, says a Hungarian Government statement issued today.

The statement welcomes the resolute and responsible policy by which leaders of the successor states created the conditions for a peaceful and democratic transformation of the Soviet Union.

The document also speaks highly of the historic role played by Mikhail Gorbachev, and the courageous and statesmanlike attitude displayed by Russian President Boris Yeltsin during the coup attempt in the Soviet Union this past August.

Mikhail Gorbachev had a historic part in developments going on in that part of the world since 1985, the statement says. As Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall stressed at a meeting with Gorbachev on 6 December, Gorbachev and his policies had an immense part in that the totalitarian system could be dismantled in one-sixth of the world and that a peaceful political change could take place in East-Central Europe.

During this period, the Warsaw Pact and Comecon have been dissolved and Soviet troops have been withdrawn from Hungary.

By Gorbachev's statement on 6 December, in which he condemned Soviet intervention in the 1956 Hungarian revolution, the last obstacle was removed from the way of building a good relationship between the countries. Through a basic treaty, signed during the Hungarian prime minister's recent visit to Moscow, a new basis was created for developing relations, the Hungarian communique says.

The Hungarian Government highly values the political wisdom and dignity displayed by Gorbachev when he left his post of Soviet president out of his own free will in the wake of the Soviet Union's transformation, making way for further democratic changes.

Hungary was among the first to establish diplomatic ties with Russia and the Ukraine during Jozsef Antall's visit to Moscow and Kiev early December. Talks have already been started on the establishment of ties with Belorussia and Moldavia. With the three sovereign Baltic states, Hungary re-established diplomatic ties as early as 1 September.

As was stressed during a meeting between Antall and Yeltsin in Moscow 6 December, Hungary backs Russia's endeavours to replace the Soviet Union in the United Nations and the Security Council, the Hungarian statement says.

"We welcome the resolute and responsible policy by which leaders of the successor states created the conditions for a peaceful and democratic transformation of the Soviet Union.

"In this process, a determining role has been played by Russian President Boris Yeltsin, who displayed a courageous and statesmanlike attitude in averting the coup attempt this past August.

"We trust Boris Yeltsin and leaders of the Commonwealth of Independent States will be able to overcome difficulties and proceed along the path of democratic development and market economy," the Hungarian Government statement concludes.

Spokesman Denies Mobilization on SFRY Border

LD2612202191 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1700 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] [Announcer] At the beginning of our last report, as you heard, it was alleged by the Yugoslav Army that a concentration of Hungarian and Croatian troops is being organized at our southern borders. Defense Ministry Spokesman Gyorgy Keleti is on the line. Is this really true?

[Keleti] Good evening. As the Hungarian Army does not carrry out reconnaissance on the territory of Yugoslavia, I neither can deny nor confirm the news regarding the concentration of Croatian troops. However, I resolutaly declare that no concentration of Hungarian troops has taken place. The rules introduced at the beginning of November regarding the introduction of the 24-hour

alert service in the barracks, and which determined a certain level of readiness in the Air Force, are still in force. The military leadership has not introduced any sort of extraordinary measure in the past days.

[Announcer] What is the situation in connection with the occasional deserters, according to which Croatian guardsmen are fleeing to Hungary during the course of various actions.

[Keleti] These sort of accusations have been made for a long time, mostly by Serbia, but also by Belgrade several times. I definitely deny this. There is no training of deserters of any sort being carried out in Hungary, and our country cannot be a refuge for any deserters, because the Hungarian border guards only let in refugees who are fleeing from the fighting over there.

Police Identify Jewish Emigre Bombing Suspect

LD2612215891 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 2000 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] The police have identified one of the suspects in the terrorist attack in Budapest on 23 December. On 14 December, George Handacker, born in Bonn in 1953, rented from the Metropolitan Autotaxi company the Fiat Tipo automobile in which the almost 100 kg of explosive was placed. The man extended the rental of the automobile on the 20th. At the time of the explosion, a young man similar in appearance to him was sitting in a Volkswagen automobile parked nearby. He drove away at the moment of the explosion. For the time being there is no information on whether he left the country or not. According to the police, it cannot be ruled out that more people were involved in the attack. Foreign, possibly Arab terrorist organizations, are suspected.

At a press briefing, it was reported that capturing the perpetrators will be possible only with international help, and Interpol also has joined the investigation. There is evidence that the attackers had been preparing for this action for months. Several threats were received by the police; thus, the two policemen escorting the bus carrying the Jewish emmigrants were aware that they were performing a very dangerous duty.

Prime Minister Interviewed on Economy, Politics

LD2712090791 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1005 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Interview with Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall by reporters Laszlo Rapcsanyi and Jozsef P. Szabo; date and place not given; reporters not identified when speaking—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Reporter] Last year we concluded the Christmas interview by the prime minister stating a fairy-tail phrase: Next year we will be able to see the edge of the forest. It looks like the forest is huge.

[Antall] I believe I can confirm that now. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] As systems transform, Central and Eastern Europe present a depressing picture. I have in mind the civil war in Yugoslavia, the Romanian revolution, which has come to a standstill, and the fact that prosperity has not really arrived. They say Hungary is an island of stability. How do you see our situation here in Central and Eastern Europe?

[Antall] This partly depends on us, on the country as a whole, and partly on external circumstances. [passage omitted]

Within Central and Eastern Europe, from a foreign policy and security policy perspective, Hungary can be considered a safe oasis, at least in a world full of conflicts. So far we have managed to keep the economy in operation. In fact, we handled the impossible situations such as the 60 percent decline in the Soviet market and our exports decreasing by 70 percent throughout the whole of the former communist bloc. We managed to counteract this partly with a 30 percent increase in exports to the West. These internal factors show that stability has a chance here. [passage omitted]

In regard to Romania, we feel that the Romanian transformation and revolution is incomplete. In Romania it is not easy to transform the economy and society. There are legal questions on politics and the constitution, and there are minority issues, with which we cannot agree. The tensions and the relations between the two republics of our Czech and Slovak neighbor, and the difficulties of the federal government are known. The problems of the Ukraine and the world beyond the Ukraine—note that I am not using the label Soviet Union—indicate that a system has collapsed in this region. The one appearing in its place has not yet developed.

If one examines this with common sense and objectively, then the only thing one can say is what Western governments and analysts say when they are not propagating information against the government: None of the countries of the region has managed to achieve more than us in the past. The views that considered fast action like shock therapy very fashionable can see today that the cautious move we practiced has proved to be the best.

[Reporter] In previous politics we often heard that the peoples of the Carpathian basin are dependent on each other. [passage omitted] It seems that Central and Eastern Europe can only help itself.

[Antall] I would say that Central and Eastern Europe can only be helped if it wants to help itself. Eastern and Central Europe cannot expect the Western world to pay for the costs of our falling behind. One can be popular for saying, for whatever moral or political reasons, that the West should pay the price of Yalta and Potsdam or for letting us down in 1956, and that we should not pay our debts. One can say such things and get applause in a room, but this does not have a realistic foundation. Without support from the Western world, without increasing investments, Eastern and Central Europe cannot emerge from the crisis. This dependance has to be

stressed. We cannot say that it is unified, as it shows very well what the eastern half of Central Europe means, what Eastern Europe means, and what the Balkans mean. These are dependent on each other as they have a common fate regarding certain issues. They were in a similar situation for hundreds of years. [passage omitted]

It is not by chance that it was Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Poland who are nearest to the association with the EC and the membership in the Council of Europe. The same is true with the handling of the Baltics. It is not by chance that there are differences appearing in the state formations created after World War I. As in Yugoslavia, the meaning of the tension of opposing cultural, political, and other viewpoints and the border of Central Europe in these areas remains to be seen. [passage omitted]

Our aim had to be—and we did not do this by chance in a foreign policy sense—creation of the Visegrad troika with Poland and Czechoslovakia. In the opposition period, before taking office, we supported the Pentagonale in direct talks with the Italian Government. We suggested that it develop into a Hexagonale, because it was clear to us that Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Yugoslavia, Italy, and naturally the primarily concerned areas of each region create a tight interdependence where symbiosis is necessary from the point of view of transport, tourism, and infrastructure.

[Reporter] What does Europeanness mean to you, especially as a historian? [passage omitted]

[Antall] Let me say that so much is being talked about Europe and Europeanness that one hardly uses the term any more. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] [passage omitted] I hear from those who do not agree completely with the policy of Mr. Prime Minister that one still must admit that Jozsef Antall bears very well the wear and tear. This refers not only to the many travels and successes of the past year, but also to the fact that you are more knowledgeable than even the journalists as to the many things newspapers write about you as a person. How do you see your image in the Hungarian press?

[Antall] I want to say that it is frequently reported how much I travel. They should always add up the hours and the days. I completed my Bonn visit in two hours and took only a few days from Tokyo to Paris and then signed three interstate agreements within nine hours. So much about travelling. I tell you this only because it has been said both in parliament and in the press that I am spending too much time abroad. [passage omitted] [five minute break in recording]

[Antall] [passage omitted] It may be said that one's family, friends, and people close to one tolerate much worse the various filth, dirt, or the reviling comments or stupid remarks than a person does himself. I read daily with the greatest indifference the press review citing those articles, and I listen to those who have no relation to reality whatsoever or who completely distort it. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] The bell often tolls for the coalition.

[Antall] This tolling of the bell is actually very old and reaches back to the beginning. I believe that the coalition will survive. This coalition has serious internal difficulties as well. However, the coalition means that three parties that have basically the same view of the world, that take into consideration the same values, joined forces in order to govern. What also comes with it is that if we are accepted into the European Parliament, just as we were accepted into the parliament of the Council of Europe, then one faction is created. This is the big difference that one must not forget. [passage omitted]

These three parties have to be considered a force that is close. I believe this bond is very strong. Neither personal nor transitional conflicts can disturb it permanently. It also has to be said here that this was clear in the summer of 1989, when internal groups formed within the roundtable talks. The talks with the other side were conducted in this spirit. In the meantime, there have been differences of views among coalition parties, as is known. At the time of the referendum of the four yesses or on other occasions, this has succeeded.

The other thing is that, personally, I joined the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] because it took on the legacy of three political parties. These other parties had not appeared yet, but the MDF actually joins the parties together. I felt and appreciated this. I can also note that these forces have to be organized into one party, into a strong national central party or a central alliance that contains this political force, which clearly emerged in 1956. This also contributes to the fact that I myself, partly on the basis of my former activities and my past, which bound me to the Independent Smallholders' Party or to the Christian youth or Christian Democratic Youth Federation in 1956, all contributed to the fact that I had close contact with the other two political parties. In fact, both political parties asked me to be among their leaders. However, I naturally did not join the other two parties. As an MDF founding member, I have only been a member since 1989—excuse me, from 1988—when it became an organization.

This has to be seen clearly. It is probably worth mentioning once that at the roundtable talks and the national roundtable talks everyone felt that there would not be a political party in Hungary that would achieve an absolute majority. Thanks to the Election Law and the Constitution, no such critical situation evolved as did in Poland during the recent elections. The party relations were in fact healthy in the 60 to 40 percent ratio of government parties to the opposition. [passage omitted]

This concept has many supporters, which is indicated by the Pozsgay-Biro National Democratic Alliance, which builds roughly on these political parties and which represents a kind of a center, left-center policy.

The other concept supported by many—Gyoergy Soross even supported it from abroad—conceived cooperation by an MDF-Alliance of Free Democrats-Federation of Young Democrats coalition after the elections and worked for this. The supporters of this model saw clearly that it was hardly conceivable that in Hungary the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Federation of Young Democrats could create a government coalition on their own. [passage omitted]

I did not find either concept acceptable. From the summer of 1989 I was against the realization of both these concepts. This is why I was against an MDF-Alliance of Free Democrats government, because a great coalition like this would have meant that two political parties would have formed an alliance that would have led to the complete deterioration of both, and would have caused such complications and created a situation such as the one that is characteristic of Austrian political life in many respects. In Germany the Christian Democratic Union-Social Democratic great coalition had a very short life and was unsuccessful. I considered this concept bad.

What I also saw as similarly inconceivable was to take part in cooperation between the MDF and a reformed Hungarian Socialist Party. [passage omitted] The one thing I could conceive was the possibility of a wide coalition government bringing together several parties in a temporarily united government if the nation faced a threat to survival and the only possibility was this to escape that threat. In other words, in 1989 when the negotiations were going on, I said that a wide coalition was conceivable. It was only conceivable that the MDF would enter such a coalition that would contain everybody temporarily. Everybody would struggle and make compromises to the same degree, not just one or the other. In any case, I was not working for this. I would not have participated in another one.

On the other hand, my aim has been very unambiguously and consciously since the summer of 1989 for a center with a nationalist, Christian Democratic orientation to be created. [passage omitted]

I am a supporter of a coalition holding this country together. I think that it cannot be nor is it rational to speak of the coming together of these three coalition partners in one political party. It is more useful if they operate independently.

[Reporter] [passage omitted] Recently I read a rather gloomy report by the OECD. The Eastern and Central European crisis raises the question as to how long the population will support austere economic reform. The report concludes that it may discourage the region's governments. Do you see such a threat and how do you view the mood of the people in the country?

[Antall] Globally speaking, the Western assessment of Hungary is incomparably better than the domestic popular mood and incomparably better than that of any other country, including eastern Germany. [passage omitted]

Regarding this OECD survey, everybody knows that production dropped out of necessity, that the majority of these countries have become insolvent, and that markets shrunk. [passage omitted] All this goes hand in hand with the decrease or stagnation of the standard of living of significant groups of the population. Their mood is bad.

The pessimistic version of Western analyses really raises the question of these countries', these peoples' capacity for tolerance: Can they bear the transformation without a social explosion? The tragedy of this is that there is no alternative. A social explosion would result not in something better, but in catastrophy. Thus, either the population has enough trust that, after going through this course of therapy, it has a chance of recovery, or it means that the patient jumps off the operating table and with his perforated appendix runs out of the hospital and then dies. [passage omitted]

President Addresses Chilean Congress 5 Dec

PY2512162091 Santiago EL MERCURIO in Spanish 14 Dec 91 pp C14, C15

["Text" of speech by Hungarian President Arpad Goncz to a joint session of the Chilean Congress in Valparaiso on 5 December]

[Text] Honorable Messrs. Senators, Honorable Messrs. Deputies:

It always has been a great honor for a chief of state, in the course of a visit abroad, to be given an opportunity to deliver a speech to congress because the legislators are the ones who directly represent the principle of national sovereignty. They represent the people, the people's hopes and pains. Through their work, the legislators also see that the popular demands guaranteeing the country's progress are met. It is a special honor for a chief of state to take the floor in the fatherland of [Chilean independence hero Bernardo] O'Higgins and, to a certain extent, of [Argentine independence hero Jose de] San Martin. I cannot forget that when the Hapsburg Empire ruled Hungary we were just conducting experiments with cautious reforms while the Chilean people had already waged victorious independence battles.

Nevertheless, I am taking the liberty to point out that, in the course of the past two centuries, the peoples of the two nations have given testimony to their patriotism and love of liberty. We have gone through trying tests—we in the Old World; you in the New World—until we reached the current possibility of building our societies in accordance with the principles of democracy and a market economy.

As one of the most important activities during my visit to Chile, tomorrow I will lay a wreath at the monument to Bernardo O'Higgins, and I would like you to know how touched I am when I note the respect that Chileans have for the great ancestors of their nation.

Perhaps I have managed to express to you that, despite the thousands of kilometers that separate us geographically, there are many common features concerning both our beliefs and our history. As you well know, Hungary recently has changed from a dictatorial to a democratic system. The changes began with a gradual liberation process two decades ago and culminated with free, democratic, and unrestricted elections in March and April 1990. The most peculiar feature of this process is its peaceful nature. The former system's leaders, aware of the inevitable nature of the changes, reached agreements, in the course of negotiations with the new democratic forces, on the transfer of power. During the subsequent elections, three center-right parties—the Hungarian Democratic Forum, the Smallholders' Party, and the Christian Democratic Party—formed a government coalition while the congressional opposition was formed by two liberal parties—the Alliance of Free Democrats and the Alliance of Young Democrats—and the Socialist Party that emerged from the reformist wing of the former ruling party. With respect to the principal issues of political democracy and market economy, there is no basic disagreement in Congress among the six parties. Nevertheless, there are serious discussions concerning the way to close the past, the way and the pace of the transition to a market economy, and the way to handle social tensions caused partly by the system change and party inherited from the past regime.

We can summarize the political situation in Hungary as follows: Democratic institutions have been created and are functioning, and the new establishment's basic laws have been introduced. Nevertheless, we continue studying, with varying success, the practice of democracy and tolerance. I harbor a hope that democratic values and ideals will be further strengthened in the near future. Nevertheless, I can affirm that Hungary will no longer be able to return to a communist dictatorship. The changes that have occurred are irrevocable. In Hungary, the freedom of conscience, religion, press, and election prevails, and both the future media law and the new constitution that will be implemented will serve to strengthen in the future the aforementioned values, ideals, and practices. (An amended version of the former regime's constitution, expressing the new democratic principles, is currently in effect). The new laws have a very positive element: For their approval in Congress, they require a two-thirds majority. Therefore, the parties are forced to seek a consensus that we require if we want to resolve the great challenges confronted by society and the tensions caused by a system change.

The political changes, the recovery of the country's sovereignty, and, as a result of these facts, the implementation of a policy in keeping with the nation's interests have paved the way for the success of our democratic system. But we can take advantage of this situation only through economic development and by resolving, or at least alleviating, social tensions. The economic structure has started to change: The number and production of small- and medium enterprises are quickly increasing, and the sale of state-owned enterprises running a deficit continues. For the time being, this democratic process has resulted in a critical economic recession, an unreal salary level, and a deteriorated standard of living, which are unavoidable factors that—I repeat—have been inherited from the past few decades. Most people agree that a certain amount of time is needed to improve their situation. They endure the hardship with great discipline and patience.

I also can see a very dangerous trend, that is, the poverty of a major part of the old medium-level sector. Approximately 30 percent of the entire society has a standard of living that is under the medium level, and the number of people who have to endure hardships to survive is growing, such as the case of the 300,000 unemployed people, who represent 6 percent of the active population, and the retirees, who represent 20 percent of the entire population.

Consequently, the government and society have focused their interests on creating a system that can guarantee the people's interests. To this end, they seek to adopt a social security strategy and establish a social structure to the extent allowed by the economy. This will result in the implementation of the social economy market announced by parties and governors, and will contribute to create a stable society.

The strong temptation to concentrate power within a society that faces certain problems and especially within a recent democracy is unavoidable. Our parliamentarian system is resorting to several means to try to establish guarantees to prevent this situation, such as the responsibility of the government before the parliament, the need to approve fundamental laws with two-third of the votes, and the creation of the Constitutional Tribunal that will be independent from the government and parliament and will be charged with analyzing the compatibility between laws and the Constitution.

The power is vertically divided by the local power system, but I have to admit that the establishment of fiscal autonomy is still to be determined. The Presidency of the Republic is not an independent power; but its role is well noted inside the country and abroad. The president, who represents the state, makes decision on matters related to foreign relations. He is a factor of balance, considering his personal prestige and his capacity as a dignitary, who is not linked to the interest of any party. As a representative of the society, he is morally and politically compelled to act in support of the social consensus and against the elements that threaten society and democracy, no matter their origin. The president, along with parliament, exerts control over the Armed Forces in his capacity as supreme commander. This system, although complicated, guarantees that the

Armed Forces will provide all the necessary support to democracy and will never threaten it.

I previously have mentioned the positive signs of the Hungarian economy: the dynamic expansion of the private sector; the initiation of the state-owned enterprises' privatization; and the favorable balance in the balance of payments that is so important for foreign trade, and the decrease of its foreign debt, which like Chile, amounts to $20 billion. The following factors can explain this situation: the liberal economic policy implemented in the last 20 years; the spirit, the business sector, the groups of executives, and economists aware of the market economy who have emerged in the national life; the economic regulations—which has not yet concluded—of the current parliament and the transition; the government's rigorous fiscal policy; and, above all, the initiative, capacity, and energy of our society.

We have awakened the interest of developed countries. Most of the greatest multinational enterprises have opened offices in Budapest, and during the first 10 months of this year, our country obtained a total of $1.2 billion in foreign capital, which represents more than half of the foreign capital invested in central and East Europe. An increasing number of businessmen have discovered that Hungary is the ideal country to become the regional economic center in view of its geographical situation, its comparative advantages, and its experiences in East-West trade.

Our international economic policy and our foreign policy efforts are concentrated in our association with and integration into the Common Market. An association agreement that recently was signed foresees important facilities for our trade with EC countries and guarantees us their financial support for the transition period, marked by the reorganization of our economy by reducing within a period of four to five years the participation of the state sector from 80 to less than 50 percent. "To be European" does not mean, of course, to become enclosed or to reject. Our objective still is to integrate ourselves into the world economy and to develop relations with other important regions, including Latin America. I believe that our association with the EC and our subsequent integration—which, I hope, will take place before the end of this millennium—will not only favor us, but also will favor our partners that are joining us in a timely way.

Another priority objective of our foreign policy involves the establishment of Hungary's and Central European security, which, after the profound changes that have occurred, is an important and complex task. For the establishment of military security and the creation of a pan-European system, we want to support ourselves on the bilateral treaties signed or yet to be signed with the region's countries and on the strengthening of our cooperation with already existing organizations such as NATO. Nevertheless, I want to emphasize that, regarding the military side, I consider the political, economic, environmental protection, and human rights areas to be more important. Concerning the human rights issue, I want to emphasize the guarantees of broad rights for national minorities and other guarantees.

As a result of historical upheavals, more than 3.5 million Hungarians have remained outside our current borders in territories belonging to neighboring countries. This explains the importance of the minorities issue in Hungarian politics and in relations with our neighbors. Two of these countries are not only in the center of Hungarian politics, but also world politics. It is difficult to estimate the final result of the ethnic and political disintegration processes and the economic integration efforts in the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, I hope for the good of world security that, regardless of the "status" of each republic, some sort of cooperation, without considering its extent, will be maintained.

In the short term, the Yugoslav conflict seems to be more difficult and less manageable. Hungary supports international efforts to achieve a solution, such as sending UN peacekeeping forces. Nevertheless, I am firmly convinced that a solution will only be achieved through the agreement and consensus of the southern Slav nations that must, obviously, be based on the principles of sovereignty and guarantees for the minorities' rights.

Among the principles behind Hungarian foreign policy, I must mention regionalism because regional cooperation can serve as a useful link in the path toward larger integration systems, such as the EC or the world economy. We consider joint actions with our Czech, Slovak, and Polish friends, within the framework of the so-called "Group of Three" and "Hexagonal Group," which, in addition to the aforementioned nations, include Italy, Austria, and Yugoslavia, to be very important. With such goals, the organizations created in other regions are fairly similar. Therefore, I have included in my tour visits to the SELA [Latin American Economic System] offices—in Santiago—and the ECLA [Economic Commission for Latin America] offices.

This tour by the first president of democratic Hungary represents a testimony to our unchanged goal to continue enhancing traditional relations with Latin America. These Hungarian policy goals also are reflected by the creation, within the Hungarian parliament, of the "Friendship with Latin America Group" whose last meeting, in which I participated, was held on 29 November. I am convinced that our political, economic, and cultural cooperation still has many unexploited possibilities. Hungarian-Chilean cooperation could play a key role in our relations with this continent as demonstrated by the experiences of the expert delegations and the parliamentarian group that participated in the Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting held in October 1991 in Santiago.

Because the two countries are, coincidentally, going through a period of democratization, sometimes confronting similar situations and tasks, the promotion of

our political relations is possible. The trade and economic relations can be favored by the fact that Chilean businessmen are seeking areas for investing their capital and that Hungary offers possibilities favorable to investments.

In conclusion, it is appropriate to mention that, for historical reasons, thousands of Chileans are living in Hungary while thousands of Hungarians have found a new fatherland in Chile. Friendships have been established and human destinies have been blended, creating bridges between the two countries, between the two nations. Today we have crossed this bridge and, following us, let's hope others will do the same.

Thank you for your attention.

(Applause)

Mr. [Gabriel] Valdes (president): "I appreciate, Mr. President, your presence and your very interesting speech. The session is adjourned."

[Signed] Manuel Ocana Vergara, Senate editor in chief

Chile-Zagreb Arms Consignment Capture Described

AU2012144491 Budapest 168 ORA in Hungarian 17 Dec 91 pp 18-19

[Interview with Colonel Laszlo Kocsis, head of a main department at the Hungarian Ministry for International Economic Relations, by Peter Borenich; place and date not given: "The Secret Routes of Arms"]

[Text] An airplane took off from Chile for Zagreb, and according to its papers, it was carrying hospital equipment. In actual fact, it was carrying arms. En route, at Ferihegy Airport in Budapest, they discovered the fraud. The ammunition and weapons have been in storage since then, and the Boeing 707 has since left the country. Naturally, the investigation is still being carried out, as is the investigation into another arms transportation affair. The Polish authorities stopped a Hungarian arms consignment in the port of Gdynia. The Technika Foreign Trade Company had addressed the consignment to an African country, but in the meantime, it had become questionable whether they really wanted to use the arms in Africa. Our correspondent interviewed Laszlo Kocsis, who is also the secretary of the interministerial committee dealing with this affair.

[Borenich] How did Hungarian arms end up in Poland, in the port of Gdynia?

[Kocsis] The port of Gdynia is one of the trans-shipment points on the transportation route that was completed on the basis of a trade agreement that was perfectly normal, legal, and equipped with the appropriate documents corresponding to international regulations.

[Borenich] Why does Hungary deal in arms?

[Kocsis] There used to be two superpowers in the world. Now there is only one—the United States. The Soviet Union was also a superpower, capable of equipping its Armed Forces through its own industry. The other countries—including larger countries like Great Britain, France, and so on—manufacture, sell, and buy arms to a greater or lesser extent to provide for their armed forces. Hungary also belongs to this group. Everyone can see in the newspapers and personally witness that the Hungarian Army owns various arms, not just Hungarian-made ones. Naturally, these have to be purchased. At the same time, Hungary's industry also manufactures such products. We are able to sell some of these products on the market. On the basis of Government Decree No. 48/1991, the Hungarian Republic issues authorizations and decides on military technology exports, imports, and reexports. State supervision must be applied very thoroughly in the area of strategic products.

Submachine Guns in Gdynia

[Borenich] What kind of arms were transported through Poland?

[Kocsis] Submachine guns and corresponding ammunition.

[Borenich] Where did they want to send these arms—or where do they want to send them? (Indeed, they may still reach their final destination....)

[Kocsis] We are talking about an African country. Given that the consignment may actually reach its final destination, it might interfere with the completion of the business deal if I named the partner in advance.

[Borenich] Why was the consignment held up in Poland?

[Kocsis] Our interministerial committee had to examine the deal on the basis of certain warnings. We did this through diplomatic means. We examined the authenticity of the documents presented by the buyer. Given that certain doubts arose as to their authenticity, the committee decided that the consignment should not be allowed to travel any further until irrefutable proof was found of the authenticity or nonauthenticity of these documents.

[Borenich] Could this consignment have been checked before it was sent?

[Kocsis] According to the relevant government decree, it is the company applying for permission that has to examine the documents. We are convinced that the company acted in all good faith. However, Hungary—or rather, a Hungarian company—is too small to be absolutely certain about the authenticity of every document.

Document Confusion

[Borenich] A Hungarian officer accompanied this consignment—at least, that is what the newspapers wrote about. We could read the following: It was when the

Danish ship was about to take on the consignment that it transpired that the documents were not in order.

[Kocsis] That is not how it happened. I would like to correct that information. The consignment was accompanied by armed attendants from its loading to the very end, regardless of the country it was transiting. This means that, in accordance with the relevant international agreements, the consignment was accompanied by Hungarian armed soldiers until the border. It is the relevant country and the relevant attendants that are responsible for the guarding, protecting, and safeguarding of the consignment. I would like to stress that no Hungarian staff, Hungarian officers, or Hungarian armed staff travelled with the consignment to Gdynia. They only travelled to the Hungarian border.

[Borenich] Why was the consignment stopped in Gdynia?

[Kocsis] It was stopped because, in the meantime, we asked for information through diplomatic channels, through the Hungarian Republic's Embassy. We asked them to confirm the authenticity of the document. The recipient country's chief-of-staff signalled that they had strong doubts about the document's authenticity. They had not issued the document, so they were not the buyers for this consignment. We then took measures to make sure that the consignment did not travel any further until the situation was clarified.

[Borenich] I feel that this should have been clarified earlier....

[Kocsis] I disagree with you. As I said, it is primarily the company's responsibility to check and clarify the authenticity of documents. If the company has no doubts about this—as was the case this time—it has acted in all good faith. The company did everything it could for the examination.

[Borenich] So what will happen to the arms and the ammunition?

[Kocsis] I think that this affair could be settled in a very short period of time. We will see whether the company can provide any acceptable, totally reliable, and guaranteed authentic end-user documents. If so, the consignment can carry on....

[Borenich] Several people believe that these arms were actually destined for our southern neighbors.

[Kocsis] People also came to see me about this, but I reject this idea most firmly. There was no talk of anything like this. I feel that this suggestion is infinitely harmful and dangerous in this unfortunately tense situation that affects our region and our southern neighbor.

[Borenich] Are there any links between the Ferihegy Airport incident and the Gdynia affair?

[Kocsis] None. At least, I do not know of any such link at all.

Foreign Migration Presents Financial Burden

AU2712115391 Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP in Hungarian 23 Dec 91 p 3

["L.K."-signed report: "It Has Used up More Than 1 Billion Already—Who Should Bear the Burden of Migration?"]

[Text] Although border traffic has decreased by at least 10 percent—partly due to the Gulf crisis and the Yugoslav civil war, and even the Turkish invasion in the summer and the pope's visit could not counteract the effects of these—1991 will probably also have some gloomy results.

The number of border violators will be greater than ever before and it is expected to exceed 30,000 people (some years ago, this figure was only between 7,000 and 8,000). In addition, while a few tens of thousands of people came across to Hungary during the Romanian revolution, even according to cautious estimates, at least 50,000 people have asked for temporary asylum from Yugoslavia this year. In fact, according to the figures of the border guard, 430,000 more Yugoslavs entered than the number that left Hungary in 1991, and most of these people are probably not staying here as tourists now.

The asylum-seekers—as this category is called in the United States—are provided for in three reception stations and 23 temporary shelters. Some 5,200 people are staying in these places at the moment. Some 23,000 people are staying in private accommodation—with friends, relatives, or helpful strangers—where they receive compensation to the value of 500 forints for food and 100 forints for cleaning each week for each person. To compensate for energy costs, the host families are given a further 1,000 forints a month in the heating period. The fact that a third of the people who arrive are children and a quarter are over 60 years old adds to the problems.

Most of the people who arrived from Yugoslavia have not registered with any authorities—barely 7,000 people asked for protection even at the border guards—therefore, there are no exact figures on their actual number. We do not know how many there are and what they are living from. It is likely that many of them are prepared for a long stay here and probably many of them are taking up illegal work. This can be excellent business for the employer because these people will do anything in their difficult situation.

This year, the large increase of refugees completely consumed the 800 million forints of the settlement fund and the $2.7 million received from the United Nations Organization. In addition, it is uncertain whether we will receive a further significant amount of aid in the near future. In fact, it appears that new burdens will be placed on us as certain Western countries expect us to stop the migration because—as it were—its effects place an unbearable burden on them. However, I doubt whether there is another small country in Europe where almost 30,000 foreigners were pronounced as persona non grata in one year. This is the number of

foreigners whose residence permits were withdrawn or who were expelled from Hungary as a result of the action on policing foreigners, which was ordered in October 1990 and has been going on with varying intensity since then. During the inspections, measures were not needed in only every tenth case, therefore, many of the foreigners in Hungary disturb the public order in some way or endanger law and order. According to some estimates, the number of foreigners staying in Hungary without permission could be as many as several hundred thousand....

Naturally, people asking for asylum or residence are judged differently, nevertheless, we must not forget that foreigners debit our budget, which is already laden with great problems, by perhaps a billion forints. There is little chance of the migration being reduced. There is also little chance of countries richer than us showing understanding, especially if the hatred of foreigners is raised to the level of official policy by a power that is increasingly shifting to the right in some places. Unfortunately, there are some examples of this already.

Foreign Minister Announces Recognition of CIS

LD2612180491 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 1700 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] The Polish minister of foreign affairs has issued a statement today, in which he announces that Poland has recognized all republics belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS], and is ready to establish normal relations with these states. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs recalls that Poland had earlier recognized her three eastern neighbors: the Russian Federation, Belarus, and the Ukraine. Relations with the three states have been based on bilateral declarations of 1990 or 1991, and on other international agreements.

Russian Embassy Informs Ministry of Name Change

LD2712101491 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network in Polish 2200 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] The embassy of the Russian Federation in Warsaw has conveyed an official note to the Polish Foreign Ministry in which it informs that, by decision of a meeting of the Supreme Council of the Russian Federation on 25 December, this state will now be known as the Russian Federation. The appropriate changes will be introduced into the Russian Constitution during the approaching Congress of Peoples' Deputies.

Deputy Minister Signs Russian Trade Agreement

LD2512051891 Warsaw PAP in English 1648 GMT 24 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 24—Deputy foreign trade ministers of Poland and the Russian Federation, Andrzej Olechowski and Vladimir Rabotiyazov, signed here Tuesday [24 December] a trade agreement regulating bilateral turnover in strategically important commodities in 1992. The agreement, concerning two-way supplies of oil, gas, coal, sulphur, pharmaceuticals and food, follows talks in Moscow held recently by Deputy Prime Ministers Leszek Balcerowicz and Yegor Gaydar. Under the protocol, Poland will receive 5 million tons of oil and 8 billion cubic metres of natural gas from Russia in exchange for deliveries of coal, coking coal, sulphur and pharmaceuticals worth 400 million dollars and food worth another 500 million dollars. Both deputy ministers who signed today's protocol stressed the fact that it contained provisions on settlements beneficial for the partners. "Both sides now have full guarantees of receiving due payment," Olechowski commented.

PDAR President Criticizes Reform Charter

AU2712100591 Bucharest CURIERUL NATIONAL in Romanian 19 Dec 91 pp 1, 4

[Interview with Victor Surdu, president of Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania, by Paul Dobrescu; place and date not given: "The Charter Is Just a Piece of Paper"]

[Text] [Dobrescu] Mr. Surdu, all sorts of things are happening within the National Salvation Front [FSN]. Does the Charter for Reform and Democracy still exist? Is the Agrarian Democratic Party of Romania [PDAR] still a member of it?

[Surdu] PDAR continues to be a member of the Charter.

[Dobrescu] Together with whom?

[Surdu] I do not know because the Charter is not functioning. Two weeks ago we held discussions within the National Coordinating Council in Iasi in connection with whether or not it is opportune to remain a member of the Charter. We reached the following conclusion: When were we serious, when we signed the Charter or now, when we are leaving it? All the eleven Council members who took the floor said that, indeed, the Charter is not functioning. We still stayed in the Charter because of its principles, and in no way do we depart from these because they are sound. However, I want to repeat, the Charter is not functioning. It had been agreed to set up a national coalition government before the miners' descent but this was not achieved. After the downfall of the Roman government, the negotiations for forming the new cabinet did not take place within the framework of the Charter. Two months after the new government was installed, none of the people nominated by us and agreed upon at the last meeting of the Charter had been appointed. Not to mention that nothing was finalized of what we had agreed should be done in order to keep the Charter functioning at county level. And I have to mention that when that communique on the replacement of Alexandru Barladeanu in the Senate and Magureanu in the Romanian Intelligence Service was released, we were not consulted on behalf of the Charter at all.

[Dobrescu] Then, forgive me, why do you stay in the Charter? You say that you agree with the principles. However, principles just exist on paper. Here, the way it functions is decisive.

[Surdu] The National Council decided that we should be patient. That is the only reason. Especially since our withdrawal from the Charter would have looked as if we were dissatisfied with the fact that of the pledges made by the majority formation in connection with appointing some representatives of our party to various positions, none were honored.

[Dobrescu] Did you hold any meetings lately? I refer to the formations that—at least formally—are still members of the Charter.

[Surdu] No. I have told you that the Charter is a piece of paper with principles. We met with Mr. Roman in Alba Iulia. We realized that he does not have a very positive opinion of us, just as we do not have a good one about him; this is so because as yet the former government has not reported on what happened to the almost $4 billion that existed at the time of the revolution nor on the other scores of billions of lei, while we, the farmers, have great troubles. From a budget to which agriculture contributes 60 percent, as was the case last year, agriculture and the food industry received 2.9 percent and This year the same percentage is envisaged.

What is disappointing is the fact that there is nothing available for us: a factory, a mill, something for us as well! I have held talks with 400 companies so far. We are fed up with paying plane fares to Bucharest for studies and assessments, without concluding any contracts. I visited Switzerland. The company that I visited prepared the paperwork for a whole year; Swiss banks have opened unlimited credit lines, which would enable the company to technologize mills in Romania or build pasta factories. The only thing is that the competent bodies in our country are not yet decided. In a matter of three months, the same company built a mill in Chisinau [Kishinev], which is in operation, while in our country it cannot do anything in one and a half years. In Hungary it built seven mills, in the former USSR 27, while in our country it cannot do anything.

[Dobrescu] Am I to understand that you did not cooperate very well with the former prime minister? Did the meeting you mentioned, in Alba Iulia, pour oil into the fire by any chance?

[Surdu] During our discussion in Alba Iulia, he said: Mr. Surdu, PDAR is finding more and more followers; positive things are being said about this party. I felt obliged to answer: Probably because we are a center party that has minded its own business. Surprisingly for someone with whom we had signed a Charter, Mr. Roman said: Yes, it is the most communist center party. Then I told him straight to his face that my parents had not been members of the Communist Party and I had lived as I had only to be able to study. I also said that there is this difference between the two of us: I am not the son of a prominent communist who introduced the communist ideology into Romania.

[Dobrescu] Did he say anything to this?

[Surdu] What could he have said?

[Dobrescu] I would like to tell you something. In the last few days I asked someone from the FSN about the fate of agriculture. It is PDAR's fault, he told me, because it holds the Ministry of Agriculture.

[Surdu] PDAR was part of the government only up to 20 May [1990]. Since then and up to the Stolojan government we have not participated in the government; a government that was hardly interested in the fate of

agricultural specialists. We are constantly seeking explanations why the wheat was not harvested. Wheat is a crop that is sown and harvested by two people: the specialist and the mechanizer. However, on 1 July we decided not to pay specialists any more, at the very moment when they had lots of work to do.

[Dobrescu] Let us return to the party. On 20 May you obtained 1.6 percent of the votes, while in the latest poll carried out by the Romanian Institute for Opinion Polls you achieved 4 percent. Have you any alliance, electoral cartel, or even merger in mind in the coming period?

[Surdu] No. We want to be by ourselves to see what we represent, what we are in terms of a political force, and what credibility we enjoy.

Administration Deficit To Be Covered by Loan

AU2612142391 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0741 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 26/12/1991—The deficit of the 1991 state administration budget, approved by parliament, was of 37.3 billion lei, announced the Ministry of Economy and Finance. In consequence of influences and changes in the volume and structure of the revenues and expenditures of the 1991 budget of the central state administration, the deficit increased to 65.5 billion lei.

That deficit will be covered by a loan from Romania's national bank. That state loan will be redeemed within five years, starting 1992.

Ministry Reports Oil Production, Imports

AU2712094291 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 0900 GMT 27 Dec 91

[Text]) Bucharest, 27 Dec (ROMPRES)—The Ministry of Industry informs that 11,350.4 thousands tonnes of oil—of which 5,207.3 thousands tonnes from import—were processed for the needs of the economy over January 1-November 30.

Over December 9-15 Romania received from import 129,400 tonnes of oil (600 tonnes less than the scheduled quantity) and another 870,600 tonnes are to be brought until the end of the year.

To increase the national resources of black oil Romania imported 516 thousands tonnes meant for thermopower stations.

Federal

Kostic Announces Creation of 'Third Yugoslavia'

LD2612184291 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1613 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Novi Sad, Dec 26 (TANJUG)—Presidency of Yugoslavia member Jugoslav Kostic today announced the creation of a third Yugoslavia, which, as he specified, would be made up of the Republics of Serbia and Montenegro and the Krajinas which cover the predominantly Serb-populated areas within the current administrative borders of the Republic of Croatia.

Three predominantly Serb-populated regions have taken the unilateral decision to unite into the Republic of Serbian Krajina, refusing to bow to Croatia's unilateral decision to secede from Yugoslavia.

Speaking at a sesion of the leadership of the war veterans' organization of Vojvodina, a province which is part of Serbia, Kostic said, "It is our wish" that the Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina also join the third Yugoslavia.

Kostic, who is Vojvodina's representative in the Presidency of Yugoslavia, stressed that, should Bosnia-Hercegovina decide to remain in the common state, the third Yugoslavia would account for 63 percent of the population of the current Yugoslavia.

Bosnia-Hercegovina is populated by three constituent peoples—Muslims (43.77 percent), Croats (17.34 percent) and Serbs (31.46 percent)—and, under the republican constitution, the decision on the republic's future must be taken jointly by the three peoples.

However, the Muslims and Croats in Bosnia-Hercegovina have taken a decision on the republic's independence. The Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina, who refuse to break away from Yugoslavia and have opposed the decision on the republic's independence, have announced that they will form a Republic of the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina by January 14, 1992.

"We respect the wish of the Macedonian people for self-determination, although we are convinced that there is no reason for them to secede from Yugoslavia," Kostic said.

Kostic accused the secessionist republics of Slovenia and Croatia of becoming "traitors of their country, and enabling Germany to fulfill its old dream and gain access to the Adriatic Sea."

Convention Set for 3 Jan

LD2612154291 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1323 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, 26 Dec (TANJUG)—At a session of representatives of the SFRY Presidency and the SFRY Assembly with delegations of pro-Yugoslav political parties from Bosnia-Hercegovina an agreement was reached today to hold a convention in Belgrade on 3 January 1992 on the new Yugoslavia.

The convention, it has been agreed, should rally all political parties and organizations from the whole of Yugoslavia which advocate the preservation and continuity of Yugoslavia as a democratic and sovereign state community of all those who wish to live in it.

Participants in today's meeting at the Palace of the Federation in New Belgrade, which was chaired by SFRY Presidency Vice President Branko Kostic, agreed to set up a coordination committee for the organization of the convention. It has been decided that the committee will issue a special memorandum explaining the motives and goals of the convention.

Banja Luka Corps Rejects Talks With Croatia

LD2412144391 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1208 GMT 24 Dec 91

[Text] Banja Luka, Dec 24 (TANJUG)—The Banja Luka corps command of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) today sharply rejected all talks, especially those in the form of ultimatums, and invited the Croatian authorities to start observing the cease-fire agreed to three days ago in Elavonski Brod.

A statement released by the command today in connection with the latest request by Croatian authorities communicated via the European Community's cease-fire monitor mission says that the corps has been requested to appoint a negotiating team and send it to Bjelovar.

The JNA Banja Luka corps believes, however, that the Croatian side does not seriously want the talks, because it has asked that the Army team travel from Banja Luka to Bjelovar via Jasenovac and Novska, although everybody knows that the bridge over the Sava River at Jasenovac has been destroyed.

"This makes impossible any kind of communication between Bosnia-Hercegovina and Croatia along this route," the statement says.

The Banja Luka corps has therefore refused the offer of talks and invited the E.C. mission to exercise its influence with the Croatian authorities to observe the cease-fire. The statement goes on to say that the "command will emphatically respect the agreed cease-fire."

Military sources inform that Croatian forces tried to launch an infantry attack last night in the area of the villages of Kricka and Rajcici, south and southwest of Lipik. They say that fire was opened from tanks, multiple rocket-launchers and artillery weapons from the directions of Novska, Jasenovac and Okucani.

The Banja Luka corps command informs that the JNA units have held their positions and [words indistinct] return fire, except to counter the infantry attacks at Lipik and Novska.

JNA Accuses Hungary of Backing Croat Military

LD2612205891 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1927 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Beli Manastir, Dec 26 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) today accused Hungary of openly supporting the paramilitary formations of the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia, enabling them to use its territory for incursions into Baranja.

Baranja, where Serbs and the Hungarian national minority are a majority population, is within the administrative borders of Croatia and borders with Hungary.

Baranja is controled by the JNA and Serbian territorial units which, as pointed out in the JNA operative group for Barnaja, are keeping a close watch on the border with Hungary.

According to military sources, massing of armoured equipment of the Croatian paramilitary formations was noted today as over the past few days. The same is happening on the other side of the border in Hungary, where Hungarian Army units are concentrating also.

The Hungarian authorities, according to the JNA operative group for Baranja, are enabling unhidered flight over Hungarian territory by Croatian agriculatural planes, adapted for combat, their incursions into Baranja and return to Hungary or improvised airports in Croatia.

Apart from this, as underscored, during the incursions of Croatian diversion groups the Hungarian authorities are organizing their reception on their side of the border and are enabling quick withdrawal to the interior of the country.

JNA Replaces Tito Picture With Yugoslav Crest

92BA0260A Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Dec 91 p 1

[Article by R. Pavlovic: "The Yugoslav People's Army Without Tito's Pictures"]

[Text] The picture of Josip Broz Tito no longer hangs in offices and other military interiors.

According to what we have learned, this task has been effectively performed in all military institutions and units. That is, under a decision of the state Presidency dated 16 October concerning amendments and a supplement to the Service Regulations on the Armed Forces, Point 90, Paragraph 1, reads: "In offices, classrooms, military clubs, dining areas, and other interiors, the crest of the SFRY (picture or relief) is to be mounted in the highest place on the wall."

This replaced Tito's pictures with the Yugoslav crest.

As Tito's pictures are being taken down, the Marshal's bust is also being removed from military institutions. All of this has taken place under the supervision of ad hoc commissions in a dignified, cultured, and civilized way, Army sources say. No politicization was allowed, and no question was made of the historical credit due to Josip Broz in creation of the armed forces.

Removal of the Broz iconography is not the last of the radical changes in the ranks of the Army. This time, it is estimated, the Army will not be overtaken by time, and new names of units, new names of garrisons, watchtowers, and repair plants are being planned. These gestures will create the conditions so that jurisdiction of the Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] is in future marked exclusively by patriotic insignia.

And other symbols of a period, call them symbols of bolshevism, are being removed or set aside and will be placed in museum-like institutions—history rooms and museums. According to the 16 October decision of the Yugoslav Presidency, a single symbol has been adopted to indicate membership in the armed forces. Instead of the red star on soldiers' caps or berets, a new symbol will be sewn on: a round design three horizontal fields in the colors of the Yugoslav tricolor. In the middle of the white field is a circle (gold for officers, silver for soldiers) in which the letters JNA or TO [Territorial Defense] are written in Cyrillic. Crossed swords, silver or gold in color, occupy the background of the insignia.

From what we have learned from the quartermaster service of the JNA, all the stickers of the new insignia have been manufactured for helmets, have been sent to units, and soon all soldiers will have the same symbols on their helmets. However, as Lieutenant Colonel General Tomislav Simovic, Serbian defense minister, recently announced, production of the insignia for caps is going more slowly because it is technologically more complicated. That is, so we have learned, negotiations are under way and a contract is being concluded with the enterprise "Zupljanka" in Aleksandrovac and "Mladost" of Subotica for production of the textile and metal insignia of the armed forces to be worn on caps and berets.

Some of the difficulties of manufacturing the new Army symbols lie in what might be called an authentic curiosity. Shops in the Zagreb factory "Ikom" were operating at full force making the former "bolshevik" insignia, red stars, buttons, and other official symbols, while there were no other interested manufacturers.

Croatia

Western Slavonia SAO Approves Krajina Union

LD2512223791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1701 GMT 25 Dec 91

[Text] Banja Luka, 25 Dec (TANJUG)—The Assembly of the Serbian Autonomous Region (SAO) of Western Slavonia late last night adopted a decision, at a session in Banja Luka, that the SAO of Western Slavonia be unified with the Republic of Serbian Krajina.

This was reported today in Banja Luka by Veljko Vukelic, president of the Assembly of the SAO of Slavonia, stressing that the decision came into effect on the day it was adopted.

Vukelic stressed that it had not previously been possible to adopt decisions on integration because the people and the organs of authority of Western Slavonia were in an exceptionally unenviable position.

According to him, two-thirds of the territory of the SAO of Western Slavonia—which is made up of the municipalities of Pakrac, Daruvar, Grubisno Polje, Podravska Slatina, Okucani, and parts of the municipalities of Virovitica, Orahovica, and Slavonska Pozega—is not under the control of the organs of the SAO, but "is occupied by Croatian forces."

The loss of Western Slavonia also means the loss of the war. If this territory "falls", Banija, Baranja, Kordun, and Knin would also soon fall, Vukelic believes.

According to him, the emigration of the population is a consequence of "the loss of people's hope in help arriving."

This has been contributed to, in part—a not exactly insignificant part—by envoys from Eastern Slavonia, who have been calling on the people of Western Slavonia to settle in Baranja and Eastern Slavonia, Vukelic said.

Vukovar Commander Released, Defends Actions

LD2412173191 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1600 GMT 24 Dec 91

[Text] [Vukovar commander] Mile Dedakovic, who has been charged with abusing his position and powers, was released from detention today, Dedakovic's lawyer Zvonimir Hodak announced. Dedakovic was released on bail, journalists were told at a news conference at the headquarters of the Croatian Party of Rights [HSP] in Zagreb.

In addition to Mile Dedakovic, the news conference was attended by some HSP leaders. According to Dedakovic, he was treated in an exceptionally professional and correct manner but, he added, he did not receive that kind of treatement from those who arrested him. He claims he was physically mistreated before being taken to the district prison. A great deal is being said about the relationship between [HSP leader] Paraga and him, Dedakovic said. There is no secret about this relationship—it was completely correct, especially with regard to the battlefront. Croatian Defense Association [armed wing of the HSP] units were deployed at the most crucial positions in Vukovar, Dedakovic claimed. Asked if he had refused to obey orders by the Croatian Army General Staff, Dedakovic said that he had never disobeyed the General Staff. He said, however, that he had never observed any cease-fire.

In conclusion, Mile Dedakovic stressed the truth about Vukovar would be revealed after an investigation, and he was very hurt by Croatian disunity. Instead of using Vukovar to rebuild our moral strength, there is evidence of certain developments and divisions that, on the eve of our recognition, are the last thing we need, Mile Dedakovic said.

Military District Denies Claims of Bombardment

LD2612231191 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 2154 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, 26 Dec (TANJUG)—The information service of the command of the First Military District announced this evening that the news carried by Croatian Radio—that Yugoslav People's Army [JNA] units today opened artillery fire on Osijek—was just another in a series of maneuvers by the Croatian leadership aimed at shifting the blame for violating the cease-fire agreement onto the JNA.

Croatian Radio claimed that hundreds of missiles fell on the centrE of Osijek and that material damage was considerable.

The communique, however, stressed that the JNA units did not engage in (combat) activities in Osijek although they were constantly exposed to the activities of the Croatian paramilitary army.

The aim of the Croatian authorities is to prevent the UN peacekeeping forces from coming, by continuous provocations and violations of cease-fire agreements.

Proposals, Debates at Assembly Meeting Examined

92BA0232C Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 6 Dec 91 p 6

[Article by Aleksa Crnjakovic, Drazen Jambrovic, Goranka Juresko, Franjo Kiseljak, and Vlado Rajic: "Prevent a Change in Ethnic Composition"]

[Text] In the debate on the economic situation and Croatia's international position, Josip Andric spoke about work, investments in development of the islands (water supply, electricity, transportation) which must not be a hindrance to understanding of the problems of Rab, because in the future it will make its contribution to the overall improvement of the situation in Croatia. According to Andric, there are about 3,000 refugees on Rab, and that is 30 percent of its population.

After expressing dissatisfaction that the deputies do not have access to all the documents involved in the negotiations in The Hague, nor very complete information about what the various sides are proposing, Stanko Kovac presented the dilemma about the role of the "blue helmets" on behalf of the HNS [Croatian People's Party] Caucus. Croatia expects them on the borders and in crisis areas in order to ensure the cease-fire, departure of the Yugoarmy, and reestablishment of constitutional order over the entire area of Croatia, while Serbia is demanding that they separate the belligerents, and at the

same time the ethnic pattern is being altered through various manipulations in certain of the occupied regions.

Kovac proposed that the Security Council be called upon to adopt a resolution (as in the case of Iraq) that would prevent a change in the ethnic composition of the population in a particular area.

Do Not Forget Lastovo

Antun Katunar proposed that the Croatian Assembly adopt a platform for negotiations so that it would be clear what the Croatian side must seek and what it may not consent to. For example, just as Croatia has adopted a law on the rights of ethnic and national communities and minorities, the demand should be made that all the republics of the former Yugoslavia also adopt such legislation. Deputy Marko "Cice" Vlasic warned that in negotiations with the Yugoarmy the island of Lastovo, where the Army has been stationed for 50 years now, not be forgotten. Croatia must demand that the JA [Yugoslav Army] abandon that island and European observers be posted on it until that occurs.

As for the situation in the economy of the Republic of Croatia, Deputy Ivan Medarac criticized Croatian banking in the view that it is not working in the interest of the sound segment of the economy and does not have a selective approach, so that the economy is being placed in a difficult position. He gave as an example the annual interest of 570 percent set by the Bank of Zagreb. Veljko Turkovic proposed that a division for protection of the property of the state of Croatia be established within the development fund to protect property on those areas of Croatia temporarily occupied. This, according to Turkovic, would safeguard that property in the threatened area and provide a guarantee of its recovery, and damaged enterprises would be guaranteed continuation of production through war damages.

Credits for Dwelling Repair

Zvonko Erak of Osijek admits that it is difficult to shape and conduct economic policy, especially in the area threatened by war, where quite a few industrial facilities and the housing stock have been destroyed and where agricultural production is threatened, but he noted that even some of the decrees that have been adopted are being carried out slowly. For example, the one about funds for urgently necessary dwelling repairs. Because some individuals have foreign exchange, why should they not obtain loans to repair their dwelling on the basis of that foreign exchange? Deputy Elizabeta Ercegovic pointed up in her speech the problem of so-called old foreign exchange savings, because the total amount of nearly $3.5 billion demands an appropriate procedure for settling this debt to individuals. She feels that this must not be left to the will of bankers, who are already showing differing attitudes toward old savers.

Speed Up the Transformation of Property

Ivan Kolak advocates the most effective possible tax monitoring, and he proposed that a prison sentence, if only for one day, be instituted for tax evasion. He believes the transformation of property should be speeded up. Bozidar Budanko asked from the speaker's platform whether all of Europe would recognize us or Europe would itself be split? Mice Radisic of Vis said that Vis is the last and most important point of support of the Yugoarmy at sea and called for urgent negotiations on the topic of the Army's departure from Vis and the waters around Vis. Dr. Ivic Pasalic said that it was acceptable for Croatia if the "blue helmets" go to the borders, but out of respect for political reality, they might also go to the crisis areas, but only until such time as elections are held and local administration and self-administration is organized.

The Plan for Postwar Development

Franjo Fofonjka proposed that the government prepare an entire plan for development after the war and that it be a consistent program for recovery, a Croatian New Deal. Marijan Malina believes that the government must be involved more directly in negotiations with the Yugoarmy in Petrinja and Banija in general. Stjepan Bujas put several questions which are being asked by fighters in the front lines. They are interested in why a general mobilization has not been proclaimed, why it has not been proclaimed that Croatia is at war, they warn that the effort is going slowly to care for the families of members of the Croatian Army who have been killed, and they want to know why the labor obligation was not established earlier so as to distribute the burden of the war more uniformly? They are interested in why workers and farmers represent the highest percentage of those in the front line of the front.

Zvonimir Juric of Djakovo proposed removing the blockade of the limited-access highway from Zagreb to Zupanja which European observers are supposed to monitor. Marin Mileta issued the criticism that the Supreme State Council has the attributes of power, but does not possess them under the Constitution. Borislav Zoric spoke about the poor assessments related to evacuation of livestock from areas affected by the war, because in the vicinity of Zagreb, Bjelovar, and other regions there are many empty stables in which livestock could be housed.

Deputy Ante Prkacin, who introduced himself as a member of the Croatian Rights Party [HSP], objected to the deputies not being given an occasion to talk about the political situation in Croatia and emphasized that this party does not agree with the way in which foreign policy and defense are being conducted, but it refrains from imposing its own ideas, because in that case there would be a conflict that would be harmful to Croatia. Prkacin emphasized that the only thing worse than bad leadership is dual or parallel management. He issued a warning about the ever greater growth of undemocratic methods,

among which he included the arrest of Dobroslav Paraga, president of the HSP, and he emphasized that some of the responsibility is borne by the president of the republic, who even in his message prejudged the guilt of the president of the HSP, which is contrary to the Constitution of the Republic of Croatia. Prkacin therefore demanded that the Assembly institute proceedings for Paraga's release and seek oversight over the activity of Croatia's secret services, and he called for the Assembly to adopt a platform that would govern the activity of the president of the republic. He said that that platform would include interethnic relations, interrepublic relations, the arrival of the "blue helmets" and their deployment.

Petition for Paraga's Release

Vladimir Seks, vice president of the Croatian Assembly, responded to Prkacin, saying that Prkacin's speech in which Croatia is accused of being an undemocratic and totalitarian state is only providing evidence to Croatia's enemies who are just waiting for it. Seks said that every deputy has the right to criticize undemocratic things and should do so. However, to refer generally to the policy of Croatia as undemocratic is to dig Croatia's grave. But as far as Prkacin's demand that the Assembly institute proceedings for Paraga's release is concerned, Seks judged that that would itself be an undemocratic procedure and a derogation of the official power. Branko Cep reproached the HSP members for recruiting people for their party through their emissaries in the field, saying all the while that they are not breaking up the unity of Croatia. Prkacin nevertheless replied that he was not asking for the Assembly to order anyone to do anything, but had only called for Paraga to be released from prison.

Ivan Bobetko also had his objections to the way defense is organized, and he reproached the actions of the political police in Croatia, which persecuted people in the past and is persecuting them now, and as he sees it this is not a road whereby Croatia can become part of Europe as a democratic country. He also reproached officers of the former JNA [Yugoslav People's Army], which they had abandoned, while at the same time "not bringing with them even a sidearm," and for not a single one of them being in the front lines of the fight, but rather "are loitering and bustling around the staff headquarters."

Deputy Ante Babic responded to Bobetko and gave as an example the Nova Gradiska battlefield and its defense, where the trained personnel of the JA displayed all their skill and were in the front ranks of the fight.

Housing Bonds

Dr. Franjo Greguric, prime minister, and Deputy Prime Ministers Dr. Mate Granic and Jurica Pavelic responded in behalf of the government to some of the questions put in the debate and to the criticism expressed. In the shortest possible time, we must transform 3,619 socially owned enterprises in the republic into private property, which is an extremely big job, Jurica Pavelic said, especially when we realize that most of the capital is actually in building structures, while the equipment is mainly of little value. The banks are also in an unenviable position, and as far as the old foreign exchange savings are concerned, Pavelic said that the government has prepared a number of solutions involving bonds with which one might, for example, purchase housing.

Those who have been driven out and those who have fled are certainly the greatest Croatian problem at this moment after defense, Dr. Granic said, because at the moment there are 565,000 of those who have had to leave their homes, nearly 300,000 of them in Croatia. In Zagreb alone, 103,000 people have been accommodated who were driven from their homes. At the same time, problems are arising with quality transportation, because, for example, combat is being waged in a portion of the Adriatic, and there are also problems with financing, because about 3.5 million German marks are needed every day. The situation will improve somewhat, according to Granic, with the help of $2 million from UNICEF and $10 million from the UN High Commissariat for Refugees. A very intensive effort is also being applied to the program for return of those who have been driven out; the government will provide incentives for their return. Granic said that negotiations are not going very well concerning exchange of prisoners, because the Yugoarmy is making them more difficult. That is, although a list of prisoners in Vukovar, for example, was drawn up in a period of 24 hours, there has been no response from the Army, and that is why the international public is also being involved in this segment.

Centralization of Negotiations

Dr. Franjo Greguric answered some of the questions, stating that negotiations with the Army should be centralized, and he therefore proposed that the negotiations be conducted in one place in the presence of the EC and the United Nations; however, this is being deliberately avoided. Greguric also emphasized that a proposal to the Security Council is being prepared concerning the number of people who will participate in the peacekeeping forces and then concerning their deployment and the countries from which those forces would come. For the moment, it is known that the peacekeeping forces will go to Bosnia and Hercegovina and to the border with Montenegro and Serbia. Adoption of the labor obligation, according to Greguric, would be necessary in order to make the most purposive use of both personnel and materiel. The labor obligation also includes those who have been driven from their homes. Greguric concluded that when it comes to the economy, local authorities in the field should make a greater commitment and save what they can. So that negotiations in the field go as well as possible, ministers went out to Slavonia and the Dubrovnik region the other day.

New Members of the Government

The deputies unanimously expressed confidence in the new ministers in the government of the Republic of

Croatia who were introduced by Dr. Franjo Greguric, prime minister, who made the case for their appointment. Jurica Pavelic, who up until now has been director of the Croatian Fund for Development and acting director of the Agency for Restructuring and Development, was appointed deputy prime minister. Dr. Stjepan Zdunic, government minister without portfolio, was appointed minister of economic development. Dr. Zdravko Sancevic, up until now special adviser to the information minister, has been appointed minister for the emigre community.

Demand for Croatia's Acceptance Into the United Nations

Following a few words of introduction from Dr. Hrvoje Kacic, chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee of the Assembly, the deputies accepted three decisions and one resolution by a raising of hands. The decisions were to recognize the Republic of the Ukraine as a sovereign and independent state, the filing of an application for acceptance of the Republic of Croatia into the Council of Europe, and submittal of an application for acceptance into the Central European Initiative (the former Hexagon). The resolution of the Assembly obligated the government of the Republic of Croatia to institute the necessary proceedings for acceptance of the Republic of Croatia into all international governmental and other institutions, in particular acceptance of the Republic of Croatia into the United Nations. All three decisions and the resolution were adopted unanimously.

Election of Judges of the Constitutional Court of Croatia

Although the deputies intended to elect the entire membership of the Constitutional Court of Croatia, the outcome of the vote did not make that possible. Of the 11 candidates nominated on the list of the Commission of the Assembly for Elections and Appointments, nine met the requirement of obtaining a majority of the votes of the deputies present in the chamber. They are Zdravko Bartovcak (109 votes for, 23 against), Jadranko Crnic (132-15), Dr. Nikola Filipovic (139-14), Ante Jelavic (133-16), Vojislav Kucekovic (124-24), Hrvoje Momcinovic (138-13), Ivan Marijan Severinac (145-11), Milan Vukovic (132-13), and Mladen Zuvela (135-11).

Marija Salecic (17 votes for), who up to now has been an adviser in the Constitutional Court of Croatia, and Vjekoslav Vidovic (23), up until now president of the Supreme Court of Croatia, elected to that post by this same Assembly, which withdrew from him confidence as a judge on the Constitutional Court, failed to receive a sufficient number of votes.

This decision removed from office those who had been judges on that court up to now: Zorka Bilalovic, Jadranko Crnic, Vjekoslav Cemeljic, Djuro Dabelic, Dr. Nikola Filipovic, Milan Pistalo, Gligorije Savic, Zvonko Spoljar, and Milivoje Zupanic. The new judges will take office on the day when the judges take their oath before the president of the republic.

Changes in the Prosecutor's Office and the Judiciary

The Sociopolitical Chamber

The session of the Sociopolitical Chamber began with a debate about the proposed amendments to the Law on Regular Courts. That is, Deputy Nikola Viskovic felt that the government's proposal was unconstitutional and that the Constitutional Commission of the Assembly should take a position concerning it, because it seeks "worthiness" as a condition for holding judicial office. According to Viskovic, that is not a condition that would figure as a legal term and he therefore asked that it be omitted from the proposed version of those amendments. However, because the government spokesman Bosiljko Misetic rejected Viskovic's proposal for "deletion," an amendment seconded by Deputy Bozo Erlic was immediately put before the meeting.

"Worthiness" Deleted From the Law

That is, proponents of the law felt that this was actually a question of a new moral and political fitness for judicial office. That amendment passed the vote and "worthiness" was deleted from the law. However, a motion of deputies of the SDP [Democratic Reform Party] calling for amendment of the constitutional law concerning the constitutional courts did not pass, and Deputy Ante Roje (SDP) left the meeting dissatisfied with the work of the Chamber, because, he said the deputies are getting more and more material in their seats immediately before the session and thus it is impossible to do good work. The deputies accepted the motion of Ivica Pasalic that the competent bodies of the Assembly examine the report of the state commission on Vukovar and prepare material for debate in the next session of the Assembly. The Chamber appointed and dismissed some 40 officials in judicial bodies.

The Chamber of Associated Labor

On the basis of what regulation is an individual unable to withdraw foreign exchange at the window of a bank in which he has deposited it, although there is foreign exchange on the other side of the counter? asked Deputy Bernard Grbic in the Chamber of Associated Labor, and Damir Mejovsek was interested in the possibilities of exchange of housing between tenants who want to go from Serbia to Croatia.

Stjepan Zetovic asked why unemployed teachers and professors who are not working are receiving full salaries, while workers who are not working are not receiving them? He put the question of why the highway is not urgently repaired from Donji Miholjac to Virovitica, which is an alternative route. Ivan Lenic is interested in the size of national pensions over the last five years, how much various people have received, and how much soldiers are getting.

Business With Serbia

Ivan Sipek raised the question of the position of manufacturers of auto parts which had been working for the program of Zastava (Jugoplastika, Inkos, and others), whether all deliveries had been entirely stopped or repair parts were being requested in exchange, because many people have cars that came out of Zastava's production program. Franjo Fofonjak called for the government to make a statement of principle and inform the economy how to behave concerning present contractual obligations and future transactions with enterprises from Serbia. The Yugoslav economy is rather intertwined, he said, a large number of Croatian factories are manufacturing components for Serbia's industry (the motor vehicle industry, the electrical products industry, metal manufacturing, etc.; it is estimated that about 50,000 workers are employed on such programs), so the economy needs to know how to behave and how to replace that market.

The Chamber of Opcinas

Deputies in the Chamber of Opcinas had an easy job in a special session, because they had before them only a few proposals to amend laws. Those proposals were unanimously adopted. For example, the Law on the Public Prosecutor's Office and on the Regular Courts was amended. The amendments put off the deadline for dismissal of judges in the regular courts and public prosecutors in order to avoid major disruptions in the work of the courts, because it is impossible to elect a large number of new judges all at once.

Conditions for Dismissal

The reasons for the dismissals are the legal provisions that a judge may not have a spouse or lateral relative or relative once removed in the same or higher regular court, public prosecutor's office, or the bar in the same town where the court is located. There are 48 persons in the courts who meet those conditions for dismissal, and of that number 24 are in relations of kinship. In prosecutors' offices, 13 persons meet the conditions for dismissal. It was stated that a selective personnel policy is needed, and that also takes time. In any case, the deadline is postponed until 30 June of next year. The amendments to the law also discarded the provision whereby a judge must be a Yugoslav citizen because Croatia has proclaimed its independence and self-sufficiency.

Vladimir Seks Explains Law on Minorities

92BA0232A Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 4 Dec 91 p 5

[Interview with Vladimir Seks by Zeljko Luburovic; place and date not given: "Ticket to Europe"]

[Text] Croatia will get the long-awaited Law on Human Rights and Freedoms and the Rights and Freedoms of Ethnic Minorities and Groups. In the opinion of certain critics of the current Croatian Government, that law came about because of an imperative of the EC, while another group of critics hold that the law is a part of the evolution in Croatian politics over the last year and a half. Vladimir Seks headed the group of experts who drafted that law, and his opinion is that the law represents the continuity of Croatian policy from the election victory, by way of the 1990 Constitution of the Republic of Croatia, all the way to the present day. Although he would say that insistence on the rights of ethnic minorities in Croatia was a kind of alibi for certain members of the EC not to recognize Croatia, Seks nevertheless categorically denies that the law came about under pressure from Europe, and he adds:

The Constants of Croatian Policy

"After the Constitution was adopted last December, a whole series of groups and experts worked on the draft of this law. However, those drafts were constantly modified in keeping with changes in the global political situation. One draft would be valid if Yugoslavia was transformed into a confederation, and another if it should disintegrate. Members of all ethnic groups and minorities were involved in preparing all these drafts, so that it would not be correct to say that the law is the product of anyone's ultimatum. Adoption of that law should have occurred by midyear, but it was interrupted by the events of the war."

[Luburovic] Is there room for the criticism that in this law Croatia has given the Serbs even more than they were asking for last summer and also for the criticism that the law has legalized Martic?

[Seks] I am familiar with that criticism. By and large, the point of departure is the assertion that cultural autonomy was refused the Serbs at the beginning. But if you go back and look at every statement of the president of the republic and every relevant political formulation, it is evident that three constants of Croatian policy were always emphasized: the fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens of the Republic of Croatia, the cultural autonomy and proportional representation relative to the share in the total population, and this of itself implies the right to local self-government.

[Luburovic] The law distinguishes the concepts of ethnic (nacionalni) minorities and ethnic (etnicki) groups.

[Seks] The ethnic group is both quantitatively and qualitatively somewhere below the ethnic minority, but that difference does not of itself imply any difference in rights.

[Luburovic] There was talk about forming Glina and Knin Kotars, i.e., kotars comprising the Croatian opcinas with predominantly Serbian population.

[Seks] That concept was given up.

[Luburovic] Has the article regulating the right to local police remained in the law?

[Seks] Yes, but it is so conceived that its jurisdiction covers preservation of public peace and order and traffic control. The Law on Internal Affairs of the Republic of Croatia makes it possible for other functions to be entrusted to the police as well, but that will be a matter for the judgment of the Ministry of Internal Affairs [MUP] or the government. However, under the draft of the law, it is not possible to delegate to the police protection of the constitutional order, nor protection and control of national borders and border crossings. The government will appoint the police chiefs in those opcinas, and they will be nominated by the opcina assemblies, and other leaders and authorized officials will also be nominated by opcina assemblies and appointed by the minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Croatia. So, there is no doubt about it, that police has a duty to enforce the Constitution and laws of the Republic of Croatia, and it is relatively independent only in that jurisdiction of its own. The state police will perform all other functions.

Stability and Elections

[Luburovic] So, there is no basis for assertions that the law legalizes the so-called Militia of SAO [Serbian Autonomous Oblast] Krajina?

[Seks] An understanding of that law should begin with its final provisions. This means that the law takes effect immediately upon enactment, but application of certain provisions pertaining to opcinas with special status is bound up with the cumulative fulfillment of two preconditions. The first is that a stable peace be brought about in Croatia. That presupposes complete withdrawal of the Yugoarmy from Croatia as well as all the other military, paramilitary, or any other formations from Serbia and Montenegro, the departure of the Chetnik formations—whether imported into Croatia or autochthonous. The consolidation of a stable peace, to go further, signifies establishment of Croatian authority over its entire territory, full control not only of the territory, but also of government administration on that territory, as well as international recognition of the Croatian borders established by the 1974 SFRY Constitution as national borders. Another precondition for the law to take effect is holding elections at those local levels. One draft of the law envisages international supervision of those elections, but that has now been thrown out. But even those elections can be held only when all of Croatia, to put it succinctly, is completely free.

[Luburovic] It is usually said that the law has been adopted in the spirit of European standards. Nevertheless, one gets the impression that the law actually exceeds them.

[Seks] I would not say so. It was drafted after the model of the Southern Tyrol in Italy, but with certain adaptations to the Croatian situation.

This Is Not a Law for Babices

[Luburovic] What will happen if the militant leaders of the Serbs in Croatia deny obedience to this law as well, as for that matter they have denied loyalty to Croatia as a whole?

[Seks] The law was not drafted, nor does any reasonable person expect that it will be acceptable to the political and military administrators of the various "SAO krajinas." So, neither to Babic, nor to Hodzic, nor to anyone of their ilk. Simply because they do not accept anything other than separation from Croatia. Accordingly, they will not accept this law either, because they do not recognize that they are part of Croatia.

[Luburovic] And what then if the Army, the Chetniks...pull out? Will Croatia again face the process from a barricade to war?

[Seks] Application of this law should be examined in the situation of when Croatia completely controls its territory, when on its territory there is neither a Serbian army nor a Yugoslav army, and therefore not Chetniks either, and when Croatian borders have been secured, and when Croatia possesses a repressive force so that it can ensure its constitutional order. To go further, all of this needs to be examined in dynamic terms. After all, the survival of the Chetnik formations and Chetnik rule in Croatia is related to the departure of all those military formations. I think that an erroneous thesis has prevailed all the while in the Croatian periodicals and even in the statements of certain politicians, and it goes this way: If there were no Yugoarmy, there would be no Chetniks. I think that the thesis is precisely the other way about: There would be no Chetniks if there were no Army. So, in those dynamic terms in which the Yugoarmy would be replaced by the blue helmets, and Croatia would be strengthened with quality arms, we should expect that those who have committed aggression against Croatia would leave that region. And then a segment of the Serbian population would consent to the status guaranteed it by the law.

[Luburovic] You said that enactment of the law denied certain European countries their alibi. We have the impression that the law is even more effective in denying Serbia all its alibis for aggression against Croatia.

[Seks] I must say that I do not expect enactment of the law to bring about any changes whatsoever in the policy of official Serbia. Because Serbia decided on amputation of Croatian territories, I think that its propaganda machine will in its own particular way subject this law to a distortion of the facts, i.e., it will attempt to assure the Serbs that the law is nothing more than a farce and a trap meant only to fling sand into the eyes of the Serbs in Croatia.

National Symbols

[Luburovic] The question of monitoring the law's enforcement is usually put.

[Seks] International monitoring of the international court for human rights is envisaged.

[Luburovic] The guarantee of collective rights also presupposes the right to national symbols.

[Seks] National symbols and banners in the draft law fall in the domain of ethnic minorities which have the right to choose independently the symbols they will use. But the president of the republic will confirm that choice. That means that no abuse of national symbols can be allowed. To go further, national symbols cannot be identical with the state symbols of another state. In private and public use, the law envisages general freedom, but opcinas can define the manner of their use. However, when those symbols are in official use then the symbols of the Republic of Croatia must always be displayed alongside them.

[Luburovic] Does the freedom of use of national symbols also presuppose the possibility of their being part of the official insignia on the uniforms of local police?

[Seks] This draft does not envisage that. Whether the MUP would allow an emblem to exist not only in those, but also in other opcinas is up to the ministry itself. The law takes the position that police uniforms should be uniform over the entire territory of the republic.

[Luburovic] One gets the impression that the Croats in the threatened areas are not happy with all that the law has given to the Serbs.

[Seks] Let us be precise, Croatia is not giving anyone anything. It is only elaborating what it has already set down in the Constitution. This is not any kind of recognition of the military success of the Yugoarmy, nor Serbia, nor of any kind of "SAO krajinas."

[Luburovic] So, it is not a question of regionalization of Croatia either?

[Seks] The law clearly states that Croatia continues to be unitary, unified, and indivisible.

Serbia

President Milosevic Urges Continued UN Auspices

LD2612183691 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1727 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, December 26 (TANJUG)—President of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Slobodan Milosevic said today that concerning the further resolving of the Yugoslav crisis, Serbia believed that it should be continued under the auspices of the United Nations, and that Serbia upheld U.N. secretary-general special envoy Cyrus Vance's plan.

Milosevic said this during a meeting with U.S. Congressman Jim Moody who is visiting Serbia.

Milosevic pointed out that Serbia does not have any territorial pretensions towards other Yugoslav republics and that it is interested in finding a political solution to the Yugoslav crisis, according to a statement issued by the president's cabinet.

Addressing Serbian parliament deputies today, Moody said that the U.S. upheld the process of democratization in Yugoslavia and the peaceful resolving of the crisis in Yugoslavia.

Moody said that he did not wish to assess who was right, but that the longer the war lasted, the more difficult it would be to end it.

New Prime Minister Bozovic Outlines Plans

AU2612165591 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Changes in ownership, management, and finances are the essence of the program of the new government of the Republic of Serbia. At the same time, the government will insist on keeping contacts with the governments of other republics and other countries, that is, to be more precise, in all cases where [words indistinct] of Serbia. This is what Radoman Bozovic, president of the government of the Republic of Serbia, said among other things at the first news conference held after the formation of the cabinet. Here is a report by Marinela Raznjatovic:

[Begin recording] [Raznjatovic] Ownership relations will above all depend on the size of an enterprise. Thus, small enterprises will mostly be private and medium-sized, and big enterprises will mostly be in the hands of institutional owners. Structural changes will be immediately followed by managerial and financial ones. This would be the essence of the program of the Government of the Republic of Serbia. (?Since a part of) the program is short-termed, as has already been heard, here is what Radoman Bozovic said about specific moves:

[Bozovic] In the sphere of the social functions of the state, as early as in the first half of January, the government intends to very practically take the risk of paying pensions and meeting social requirements [podmiriti socijalne funkcije] on a regular basis in the entire republic. In our opinion, this must be considered a priority, considering social tensions and the socioeconomic structure in our republic at the moment.

[Raznjatovic] In reply to the question of how one can improve the economic situation in Serbia, which is threatened by hyperinflation and social unrest, Prime Minister Radoman Bozovic said that as early as in a few days he will hold talks with the representatives of other republican governments and the Federal Executive Council, that is, with all bodies with which Serbia has joint economic and cultural interests. Contacts will be established with other countries also, to acquaint them more thoroughly with the crisis to stimulate an economic

interest. Besides, the prime minister supposes that the interest of capital will overcome the interest of politics in a larger part of Europe.

Concerning the political situation in Yugoslavia and the possible escalation of conflicts after 15 January, Bozovic is of the opinion that the United Nations and some other interested countries, such as the United States, will exert an influence so that other, more just, solutions to the crisis can be found.

Marko Negovanovic will only be the minister of defense of the Republic of Serbia, Bozovic said in reply to the question of whether Negovanovic will at the same time perform the duty of assistant federal secretary for national defense. [end recording]

Micunovic Condemns Further Conquests by Serbia

92BA0207A Belgrade BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 1 Dec 91 pp 6-7

[Interview with Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic, president of the Democratic Party, by Milan Becejic; place and date not given: "War Is the Costume Worn by a War Policy"]

[Text] Why is it that a sign saying "The flower in the hair of the ruling party" was maliciously pasted up on a speaker's platform of the Democratic Party?—that was the "warmup" question for Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic, president of that party, people's deputy, and a delegate of Serbia in the Federal Assembly. "I do not agree with the question!" Dr. Micunovic replied with his professorial charm, paraphrasing the slogan attributed in jokes to the president of the Serbian state.

Both he and the people at the top of the party feel that the Democratic Party and its mission must in the present political moment be viewed in the context of the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the role of Serbia, and the events of the war. It is in that sense that the appearance of Dr. Micunovic on TV Belgrade the other night has specific importance.

[Becejic] Your appearance on Belgrade television the other night was unexpected for many people, and I have even heard comments from people who perceived this as new tones coming from the Democratic Party.

[Micunovic] Following the news that an agreement had been reached in Geneva as some kind of progress in resolving the Yugoslav crisis, I wanted to issue a warning by way of alarm that this is the last chance for us to somehow see the end of the war, and I asked the television station to communicate that warning publicly. All the signatories of the agreement on the truce must realize that their personal responsibility is immense and historical. Also, every participant in the conflict must also know this: that we have a chance to pull out of this war, to move on to the negotiating phase, and to resolve the problem of the Yugoslav state in a civilized manner. And if someone carried away after Vukovar wants to go on to conquer Osijek or to "liberate" any Croatian village or to have a showdown with the regime in Zagreb, that that would be the kind of escapade that would place Serbia in a horribly difficult position of being principally responsible for the war and all this suffering, and, of course, would subject it to a much fiercer blow of world opinion than it feels now. So, that was another appeal, although we as a party were always against the war and in favor of seeking reasonable and peaceful solutions. We were against going beyond the necessary defense with an excessive use of force, just as we were against entering any Croatian village or city, because that would take away the principal motivation given for this warfare—protection of the Serbian population.

In that respect, our position has always been clear, although we did not agree with those first decisions which would have recognized a unilateral act such as proposed by The Hague conference. We approached it above all from the standpoint of assessment of how much it contributed to peace or not and how much it protected people from the terror to which they might be exposed. We felt that that document led toward further warfare, would have produced a river of refugees from the Serbian regions in Croatia. We endeavored to point out that all these issues must be resolved differently—through referendums, plebiscites, agreements, compromises, that people must agree on the borders, each side making concessions to the other. If the result should be completely separate, independent, and opposing states, then those borders arrived at by force would never be stable. A solution which in the end leaves two and a half million dissatisfied is certainly not a good one. It has been in our mind all the while that neither the problems of the borders nor the relations in the state can be resolved by war. Of course, if someone is threatened, then every resistance is legitimate, but one cannot draw from that any justification for any kind of offensive action. I would like to point out that any effort, and many participants in the war have so indicated—of going further—would result in disaster. Unfortunately, I hear that my appearance on television was not preceded by any announcement, it was as though it fell from the sky, and to that extent it left people wondering. In a day or two, we will have a press conference in which we will present our view in detail concerning the crisis and possibilities for getting out of the war.

[Becejic] Is there a danger of identification between the Serbian interest and the Serbian regime?

[Micunovic] Every government tries to create the impression that it represents the general interest. It is in fact on that basis that it survives—by representing its own interest as the general interest. However, when wars are waged, then a government has more chances to muddle its own interests and the interests of the people. Then the intensity of internal conflicts is diminished by bringing in a third party from outside to serve as an enemy, and that external enemy serves the purpose of

unifying those within. Then, of course, the government figures as the standard-bearer of that interest.

Most governments take advantage of such a situation, especially when the war is going well for them. But at the same time there is a great risk here, because if the war begins to be lost, then such a government automatically loses power. Today, we cannot, to be sure, be blind to the fact that there does exist something that constitutes the broad interest of the people. This can best be seen at the international level: When the discussion is even of the Army, of paramilitary units, of Serbs from Bosnia, from Knin...then the discussion is nevertheless about Serbs. In a way, Serbia as a state is considered responsible for everything the Serbs are doing, and in a certain way it does in fact represent them.

Compromise Is the Strategy of Every Democracy

[Becejic] You must admit that it is a very difficult and thankless task to balance the national interests.

[Micunovic] Everything was possible after the disintegration of the empire of real socialism, because instead of going to the citizen, in which case the people would have signified the demos, that is, people who are members of the political community, we remained at the level of people that would only be an ordinary mass subjected either to terror or fear of manipulation. When the time came to achieve that in political pluralism, ethnic conflicts came along, and the demos was reduced to the ethnos. Even now, instead of citizens we have nationalities, instead of members of political parties we have members of ethnic groups. Of course, it might all end in what the Greeks called homilos—the crowd or the mass, which means that we cannot have democratic systems for a long time yet.

That is our reality, and so it is difficult not only for a politician, but even for a sociological analyst, not to be led astray and manipulated, to manage at every moment to distinguish these levels and to try to maintain that civil aspect, in the sense of the demos, and at the same time be fully aware of the threat of the ethnos. Insofar as that is possible, then, what Serbia knew somewhere around 1914—that even when it was threatened, even as an ethnos, it should preserve the demos, that is, it should preserve its parliament, its political parties and political freedoms.

[Becejic] You recently said that for Communists politics is a war in which there are only winners and losers and in which there is no place for compromise.

[Micunovic] Democracy requires more than merely having political institutions; it is also very important to have what is called political culture, behavior, and education. It has not been possible to teach this in the regimes so far either in terms of theory or practice. Democratic institutions can be set up in a constitution and laws, but the way they function is far more essential, that is what their effect depends on, and that is a matter of political culture. Compromise is the strategy of every democracy.

When differing opinions, arguments, and ideas are confronted, it is quite certain that the result lies in some compromise, so as to arrive at some common objective that will satisfy the largest number of people. The understanding of politics that has come out of the way in which authority was shaped in the postwar socialist state is built on the awareness that that power was built by revolution, in which the most important thing was to define who is the winner and who the loser. It was naturally stressed that the "defeated forces did not dare to raise their heads." So, politics is perceived exclusively as warfare, because power was gained by the implements of war, with weapons, solely on the basis of having won. The object is to constantly preserve that sweet role of the victor, because that is the basis for perpetuating power. Which accounts for the phrase—"we gained power by shedding blood, and we will not give it up without blood!" People have completely forgotten that power is lost and gained by ballots, which means that power is possible only as consensus, i.e., by consent of those who are governed.

[Becejic] Do the present leaders fit into that framework?

[Micunovic] Certainly, these are people with the old political culture. This is demonstrated not only in those interrepublic and interethnic relations, but also within each republic—in the relation between those who hold power and the opposition. The most important thing for the government is to stuff the opposition into a mouse hole, to restrict it, to make it evident who won the election. That is exactly what the party of Slobodan Milosevic has been demonstrating to us from the election to this very day—it is assuring us that they are the winners. It is only that a slipcover has been pulled over that same feeling of politics as warfare. But if you look at how the electorate in Serbia was divided, the winners have to have much less complacency. Power is divided so as to facilitate compromise, not so that every initiative from the opposition is met "with knives" so as to measure the winner's authority and power.

[Becejic] To what extent can the existence of this kind of psychology perpetuate this war?

[Micunovic] The duration of the war, of course, is largely the result of the existence and domination of that kind of political culture. If that political culture were democratic, we never would have entered the war. There was not a single dispute which could not have been resolved through negotiations, in a peaceful manner. To be sure, everyone need not have been satisfied with those talks. After the endless conversations, in the end we came to a demonstration of force, that is, this is that same voluntarism which dates back to a revolutionary movement, in which everyone can present everyone with a fait accompli. Just as Tudjman presented Yugoslavia with a fait accompli, so the Krajina faced him with one. Now that

we have managed to frighten the entire world, not only ourselves, other factors are fortunately operating as well. I cannot imagine how I would have survived without hope that this madness would cease and that we would get back to normal talks and a search for solutions that would satisfy the greatest number of people.

Thoughtless Use of the Word "Traitor"

[Becejic] To what extent has the danger of possible political terrorism brought several of the opposition parties back to the same table?

[Micunovic] To some extent, the authorities themselves have begun to be aware of this danger, but only time will tell to what extent they have become aware. The disturbing thing is that there are no real results of a single exploration. A few months ago, the offices of the Democratic Party were broken into, machines were broken, but even though there has been a commission of inspectors, so far we have not received any information at all as to who the attackers were and whether they have been detected at all. The names of those who attacked the headquarters of the Reform Forces and Peace Movement are still not known either.

This means that the competent departments of internal affairs are not able to control such things, or, on the other hand, for some reason they do not want to inform the public of this. Instead, we have heard "explanations," even threats from certain public figures, people who lead certain parties or movements, addressed to those who think differently.

Even if there had not been those threats, it is clear that every thoughtless use of the word "treason" and "fifth columnist" is a case of arousing those mentally unstable people who then begin to think it is their duty to render verdicts. Today, everything is permitted in our situation—first verbally, tomorrow with clubs, and the day after tomorrow with machine guns.

It is natural that all the opposition parties should be the prime targets. No one went to break into the headquarters of the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], presumably afraid of the consequences. It is clear from that recent meeting and agreement of several political parties that no political program for uniting the opposition will be forthcoming, but it is quite possible that they will work together, for instance, in fighting political violence, and we will defend ourselves against that.

[Becejic] You conveyed to Lord Carrington the dissatisfaction of the Democratic Party with The Hague document, and on that occasion you emphasized the problem of confusing state sovereignty with national self-determination.

[Micunovic] If Yugoslavia is thoughtlessly destroyed as a state and legal entity, then this is a threat to the United Nations and the Helsinki Agreements. Because this is done by means of the right to self-determination, which actually is a category of law which arises out of human rights for protection of minorities. But if they had already done that, then they would not be able to proclaim the republics states with inviolable borders. So, what they have taken away from Yugoslavia, they are returning to the republics, and now they are not allowing that principle of self-determination to operate within the republics.

[Becejic] The leading figures of your party have had contacts in recent months with important political figures from the United States, France, England, Russia, Poland.... What has been the result of those meetings?

[Micunovic] We have above all learned what the world thinks about our crisis, but at the same time we have tried to articulate a position that would offer some solutions for Yugoslavia and Serbia, and we have been explaining to those important people exactly what is going on here. The world is looking at us with great anxiety and in large part is unable to understand why the war occurred. The official authorities of all the republics have contributed to this, because they have rather one-sidedly portrayed the Yugoslav drama, in which various levels are mixed—in some cases, historical, in some cases, cultural, in some cases, political. In that forest of information, people in the world simply have been unable, nor have they had the time, to penetrate to the essence of our problems and processes.

[Becejic] One view of yours presented in an interview with the periodical ROSSIYA is a bit contradictory. First, you said that moving the solutions to our crisis to the international level is illegal, and then you wanted to see the United States and Russia (USSR) among the countries that will influence Yugoslavia's destiny.

[Micunovic] In this situation of ours, it is difficult today to use the terms legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, or something to be better understood. The existence of civil war has subordinated everything to pragmatism, and many fundamental things have therefore broken down. In terms of international law and the UN Charter, it is incomprehensible that the states of the Community could decide the destiny of Yugoslavia on the basis of legal application of international legal enactments, when Yugoslavia is not even a member of that community. However, we ourselves sought the aid of the EC, because in waging the war we placed ourselves in this kind of situation. First, the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe [CSCE] emerged in a legitimate way, because it is concerned about European security, and we signed those documents, and then afterward CSCE delegated its jurisdiction to the EC. Of course, it is not up to external international factors to extinguish the international subjectivity of a state. The action of the international community is legitimate (regardless of how legal it is, on the basis of the documents that have been signed), provided that European and world peace are the result of that. If that is the case, then in working out the destiny of Yugoslavia the United States and the USSR have a greater right than Germany or Italy, because these were victors in World War II.

A String of Misfortunes

[Becejic] I will remind you of two of your sentences carried by ROSSIYA. "Down through the centuries Serbia's misfortunes have occurred in advance of all the misfortunes of Russia...." "Perhaps God is so merciless toward our country in order to give yours a chance." Did you have some parallel in mind?

[Micunovic] There is a parallel, but to a much greater extent our destinies have been historically intertwined. Thus, the First Serbian Uprising was to some extent because of Russia's involvement against Turkey. Following Napoleon's invasion of Russia, when it had to conclude a truce with Turkey, this was immediately reflected in 1813 on the destiny of Serbia, and Turkey had a free hand. And then, after Napoleon's fall and Russia's "return," it became possible for Serbia to rebel again, and later to wage a struggle for independence. Of course, it would be a mistake to draw a lasting symmetry from that.

Both Russia and Serbia have in a way built the entities that serve as their states in the form of federations of states. Even the first postwar Yugoslav constitutions were built on the Soviet model, and certain principles of federalism and concerning the nationality question were taken over. Now we face the same problems, and the concept of sovereignty as the right of citizens to choose their representatives (that is how it has been conceived for the last 300 years) has been reduced to equality of nationalities. Instead of the rights of citizens, members of nationalities have received compensation in the form of political equality of the nationalities, which would also include those which have seceded. Probably at that point there really was no serious thought about secession, because a strong political center existed, but when the center fell apart, so did the structure of the state along all its ethnic seams. We are now serving as a warning of what could happen to the Soviet Union unless reason and political sophistication prevail, and certainly it would have far more terrible proportions. They have something which is both a danger and a hope at one and the same time—atomic weapons, which are now located in three different republics. Because of the balance of fear, they dare not fight, and perhaps this will help them to keep them from the situation we are in.

[Becejic] How realistic are certain expectations here that Serbia could rely on Russia (USSR)?

[Micunovic] There certainly could not be any military involvement on which one could rely. What can be counted on is pressure that will be exerted above all because of themselves, so that this "virus" of ours is not carried to them and does not impose on them this solution of ours as the only one. We are now a laboratory in which experiments are being conducted with all the horrors, but the laboratory is still under control.

[Becejic] To what extent have the present delegates in the Federal Assembly, and you, then, as one of them, been manipulated with respect to a composition that does not correspond to the SFRY Constitution?

[Micunovic] I do not believe that this will last long, nor that any manipulation is taking place. When I came to this recent session, I did not know who would be coming, because the summons was sent out to all. Representatives came from two republics, a truncated delegation from Bosnia, and one representative from Croatia, but all of that together was not enough for this chamber and this assembly to be able to truly represent all the citizens of Yugoslavia. With that kind of makeup there is no sense in making decisions that affect the entire country, nor can anyone be convinced of that.

There are some people who have something I would call a "phantom" illness, and that is they believe that Yugoslavia actually still exists in the same way. That illness is well-known in surgery, when they amputate someone's extremity, he continues to feel pain or itching in the part that has been amputated. And so it is with the state's presidency as well as in the SFRY Assembly. The question is who is obligated by the decisions made there? Thus, a truncated federal sovereignty figures as a protector of only Serbia and Montenegro, which creates great legal confusion.

[Becejic] You recently took that existence/nonexistence of a parliament to the level of the ancient Greek interpretation of barbarism.

[Micunovic] I used that expression "barbarism" in the Hellenic sense, because the ancient Greeks called all their neighbors barbarians. Not out of arrogance. They knew that the Egyptians were more highly developed in terms of civilization than they were, but the Egyptians did not have a constitution, but a pharaoh, just as the emperor in Persia, say, held undivided authority. Deified to the extent that as a deity he emanated (emitted from himself) the right of that state. For the Greeks, this was barbarism, and they clearly distinguished tyranny from free states, because in a tyranny government did not conform to a constitution. So, to get back here, the barbarism we are witnessing on the battlefield is only a consequence of the disintegration of the legal system as a whole, of legal barbarism. People reason that if they are not bound by the Constitution, then they are not bound by international conventions on respect for civilians, civilian targets, wounded, prisoners, and so on, either. As soon as people think that they can do everything, it is clear that they will not be awakened by the angels, but by the devils.

[Becejic] To what extent can the opposition and people who think differently than the government be intimidated by being called "traitors"?

[Micunovic] That is an aspect of this barbarism, when there is no legal order, then you frighten everyone with a machine gun. Before that, you proclaim yourself the interpreter of legal interests, everyone who thinks differently and who does not follow you in this may be a traitor, and you use those measures toward a traitor

which you feel are appropriate. The first time you will break into his offices, the next time it is his head. That pressure is present even in the official media. In the world at large, there is no point in anyone calling himself a great patriot, because this is a specific matter that can always be checked. Calling names on the basis of one's own conviction is punishable and impossible in the civilized world. There, everyone is a patriot until the opposite is proven. Here, this follows from the old political culture of the so-called victor, because the defeated were traitors, and that is why they deserve to be defeated. It will frighten only those who can be frightened.

[Becejic] Can any parallel be drawn between the paramilitary formations in Croatia and those in Serbia?

[Micunovic] First, they start with verbal threats and gatherings, and later, when the opportunity offers and when various groups of this kind can be used, then the so-called paramilitary units are also created. After that, those parties proclaim themselves to be patriotic and decide to arm themselves, and then under a tacit agreement with the official circles, or in some other manner, they are transformed into armed units. That is how armed might is decentralized, so that there is no hierarchy nor control of weapons, and everything becomes horrible. Often, this degenerates [words illegible] organizations which become fascist by the nature of things, because they bandy about the same symbols and violence, and this is used against people who think differently. At the same time, this is a boomerang which comes back against the regime itself, because it imparts its traits to it. When they begin to threaten it, then there is an amputation, and that is what Tudjman did with Paraga.

[Becejic] Fine, Tudjman has attempted in this way to get rid of the anathema of fascism, how can Serbia get rid of the anathema of bolshevism?

[Micunovic] I think we are dealing here with two different things, especially since this case with Paraga is specific. The phrase "bolshevism," which is applied to the regime here, I will use conditionally, because it is inappropriate. In any case, if this regime wanted to represent itself as democratic, or, to use their expression, "more democratic," it would first of all have to change its attitude toward the opposition, then get rid of the monopoly over the media, it would have to be much more rigorous toward political violence, on the economic plane it would have to cease the powerful state interventions and the smothering of private initiative.... So, it would have to make a number of concessions to other opinions and free itself of monopolistic ambitions for absolute control of the public, the economy, and political life.

What Is the Serbian Interest?

There certainly exists something that is the Serbian interest, but if we break it down, it is clear that there also exist great differences. The interest of the government might be one thing, the interest of the people another, and then there would be the interest of many groups which differ—the Serbs in Zagreb are in one position and have no chance of making themselves heard, and then there is another situation of the Serbs, say, in the Krajina, who already have their autonomy, and there is still another situation of the Serbs in Bosnia, who share power there and who are not a disenfranchised ethnic minority, but who are in danger of being separated once and for all from the parent state, and a fourth case is that of the Serbs in Belgrade and Kragujevac, who live in a state where Serbs represent the majority, in which there is no direct danger of being reached by the war.

All of these differences cannot make us blind to the knowledge that an ethnic war is being waged here and that actually there is something that is the interest of the people, because great emotions would not otherwise be generated, and that all these groups, in spite of the different situations in which they live, feel something in common. However, it would be a mistake if we overlooked the fact that the partial interest of a regime can be passed off as that general interest of the nationality. Such things should be carefully balanced so that one does not find himself in a situation of being manipulated, so that some interest of a regime or party is represented as the general interest of the people, so that he takes part in that cause thinking that he is defending some general interest. At the same time, it would be very selfish and mistaken if a man turned a deaf ear and made out as though that interest of the people did not exist.

Revenge of the Frustrated

[Becejic] What do you mean by "armed anarchy"?

[Micunovic] This is one of the consequences of the war, in which an enormous number of people have weapons, and at the same time they are not under control. Such groups even now, during the war, represent a major problem even for the Army. This will become serious only after the war is over, unless it is resolved in time together with the negotiations concerning the truce. After the war, a large number of people will emerge, either dissatisfied or disappointed, those who have lost their homes and have become refugees, and others who have been frustrated in certain national, political, or ideological projects and plans they had.

If such groupings attempted to assert themselves, then that powerful weapon could be used to settle mutual accounts. A report would have to be submitted as soon as possible on the quantity of weapons, on the incidents to date, and also on the forms of political violence to date, and then a very strict arms control should be imposed and weapons taken away from those who do not have permits. Unless all these precautions are taken, we could easily arrive at the form of "armed anarchy," which is well-known in many civil wars and is the most horrible of anything that can happen. We already have this, say, in Cuba, and this form of "meting out justice" is a particular concomitant of great shortages.

Seselj and Mesic

Dr. Dragoljub Micunovic is consistent in his decision not to mention Dr. Vojislav Seselj again, a man whom in the days of his political exile he defended and aided. This "parting of the ways" began in the deputy benches, and although Dr. Seselj has said unofficially that Micunovic is for him the only true deputy in the National Assembly, the leader of the Democratic Party says that Seselj is "dead" as far as he is concerned. Nevertheless, a gratuitous and unofficial observation of Dr. Micunovic will be recorded: "I will report him to Vojvoda Djujic, because it is absurd for a Chetnik to be an antimonarchist!"

A day after the "bombardment" of Banski Dvori, Dr. Micunovic and Stipe Mesic happened to meet in Strasbourg. After Mesic had done his inimitable marketing of the "bombardment" with the European Parliament, there followed a brief dialogue:

Micunovic: What happened yesterday in Banski Dvori?

Mesic: It was terrible!

Micunovic: More terrible than those chemical weapons?

Mesic: Much more terrible.

Micunovic: Which means that the business of the chemical weapons was not as terrible as you represented to America...?

Democratic Party Leader Explains Moves in Bosnia

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[Interview with Dr. Radovan Karadzic, leader of the Serbian Democratic Party, by Dada Vujasinovic; place and date not given: "A State Which Is Coming Unwound"]

[Text] After explaining to Mr. Alija Izetbegovic and the Muslim-Croat deputies in the Bosnia-Hercegovina parliament that they would not lead the Serbs out of Yugoslavia with "some kind of little paper" on sovereignty through The Hague, regardless of the price, Dr. Radovan Karadzic led the Serbian deputies out of the republic Assembly with prospects that they would not be returning. We did the interview on the day when the SDS [Serbian Democratic Party] leader brought his deputies together to confer on what they should do in the future. Dr. Radovan Karadzic, psychiatrist and author of four books of poems, as has been his custom since he embarked on the waters of politics, consented to speak only in the plural, more precisely, in the name of the party which he heads. To start out, I asked him to comment on the new situation that has come about in Bosnia-Hercegovina since what the SDS judges to be an illegal session of the Assembly, since proclamation of a sovereign Bosnia, and since the attempt of European diplomacy to simply rub out Yugoslavia with an eraser.

[Karadzic] For the last 70 years, we have believed that we had a state, that that state is called Yugoslavia, that its legality stands firmly based on its Constitution and laws, on its participation in two wars on the side of the victorious powers. We believed that we should sacrifice to the creation of that state much of our history, culture, and spiritual legacy. That we should forget our Karadjordjevic dynasty, to hold back our gusle, in short, to act as though we did not exist. These days, we are looking at the final act in the destruction of that state. The agreement reached in The Hague presupposes abolishing everything that constituted the legality of that state except the republic borders which the Broz oligarchy sketched in an altogether arbitrary way. Now the Serbs are being accused of wanting to change those borders. That is not so. Those who accuse us want to turn ordinary administrative lines into national boundaries, above all in spite of the living tissue of the Serbian people.

We believed that we should help our neighbors, the Muslims, not to regard themselves as a religious sect, to cramp our style a bit so that they would stand tall beside us. There seems to have been no end to our naivete. The last session of the Assembly demonstrates all the intentions of our partners in the coalition and of our neighbors in the state. They are ready to slaughter an ox to get a kilogram of meat, to sacrifice the tradition of our life together and our readiness for compromise in order to show a piece of paper, a forgery, to the European gentlemen and thereby threaten an entire nationality, a patient people.

From the legal standpoint, the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina is now on the threshold of lawlessness. Our partners in the coalition are so concentrated on their ultimate objective that they do not care what means they use. Unfortunately, in the European Community they have abandoned the principle of legality, so that the Serbian people must take appropriate steps. Sovereign Bosnia controls no more than 60 percent of its territory, and I ask you what state in such a situation can be truly sovereign and independent? Those are areas in which the Serbian people are in the majority, and that is not to mention the territory where the Serbian people were before the genocide was carried out. It is no accident that I mention the genocide, because any creation of an independent state on a territory where genocide has been carried out against a people would be to derive benefit from a war crime, and international law prohibits that.

Many States on the Same Territory

[Vujasinovic] In those areas which you say sovereign Bosnia does not control, the SAO's [Serbian Autonomous Oblasts] have been created, but for the Muslims and Croats that itself is evidence that the Serbs were the first to start to pull Bosnia apart and that they were actually the first to violate the law.

[Karadzic] Nowhere have the Serbs behaved unlawfully so far. The first flagrant violation of the Constitution is

Communist Amendment 60 to the Constitution of SR [Socialist Republic] Bosnia-Hercegovina, which proclaims the republic a sovereign state of nationalities and citizens. As for the creation of communities of opstinas, they were formed strictly in compliance with the Constitution of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The subsequent proclamation of the SAO's of Krajina, Hercegovina, Romanija, and Semberije is an expression of political will in favor of remaining in the federal state. We did this above all because our partners in the SDA [Democratic Action Party] have been violating our previous agreements. The proclamation of those oblasts has always stated that they are considered territory of Bosnia-Hercegovina and territory of the federal state, but above all of the federal state, and that this decision will be taken to the Assembly in order to give it proper legal sanction.

[Vujasinovic] A possible interpretation of the behavior of the deputies of the SDA and HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] in the last session of the Assembly is perhaps a response to the situation in the assemblies of the Serbian regional oblasts, in which there are no Muslims and Croats.

[Karadzic] That is not so. It is all just the other way about. All the Serbian moves, to use the language of chess, have been forced. We were also forced to establish the SDS as an ethnic party. We hoped that we would remain a community in this region, but now we have realized that we are dealing with perfidious partners.

[Vujasinovic] After the deputies of the SDS left the Assembly, does it not seem to you that perhaps there was a way of refraining from partnership with a bit more feel for diplomacy?

[Karadzic] The SDS deputies did not leave the Assembly. They left when the session was adjourned.

[Vujasinovic] What went on before that? At one point it seemed that Mr. Izetbegovic and you had reached an agreement.

[Karadzic] Ask Mr. Izetbegovic why he cast aside our three months of discussion and agreement. We were truly close to a solution. But Mr. Izetbegovic is a perfidious man. When it seemed that we had succeeded, the declaration of sovereignty came all of a sudden. Which meant that we had spent all of three months on agreements that were nothing more than a waste of time. But we assumed that those agreements would be in vain, so that we prepared real political responses to a possible deception.

[Vujasinovic] The Belgrade initiative had no chance whatsoever among all those platforms, memorandums, and resolutions?

[Karadzic] Mr. Krajisnik was right when he said that the Muslim people would look back on that document with regret. After all, it had no chance whatsoever when there is so little independent action by the Muslim deputies. Now it continues to apply to the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina, and we will bring it up-to-date and carry it out in our part of Bosnia.

[Vujasinovic] Mr. Izetbegovic insists that you say specifically what you do not like in the memorandum on the sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina, because he says that both that document and the platform of the Presidency are only an elaboration of the present Bosnia-Hercegovina Constitution.

[Karadzic] That is not so at all. I will not deal with the memorandum, because it does not exist. The memorandum locates Bosnia-Hercegovina outside Yugoslavia.

[Vujasinovic] The sentence which you uttered in the last Assembly—to the effect that the Muslim nationality would disappear if Bosnia is sovereign, was perceived as an outright threat by the Muslims.

[Karadzic] The fact that they improperly interpret one of the thousand sentences which I have uttered in the last year and a half tells us more about the interpreters than it does about me. From the speaker's stand in the Assembly, I was merely paraphrasing Mr. Muhamed Filipovic, who said that if things take an unfavorable turn, that would be the beginning of the end of the Muslim people. Even today, I think that the Muslim people is the most threatened at this moment, that because of the way in which they are led they have been placed in a situation of confronting the Serbian people. And that certainly will not be a good thing either for the Serbs or the Muslims, but because there are nevertheless a large number of Serbs, the Muslims are more threatened. They are more threatened not only in the physical sense, and I did not mean that they might disappear only physically, but that this would be the beginning of the end of their ethnic identity. If Bosnia is divided up so that no territory is left for the life of the Muslims, they will again be threatened as a very young nationality, as a nationality with highly vulnerable spots. I am thinking here above all of language, history, and so on.

[Vujasinovic] The splintering of Bosnia now seems inevitable. What is your comment on Mr. Kljuic's statement that the Muslims and Croats should leave Yugoslavia together with Slovenia and Croatia?

[Karadzic] Good luck to them! But they will not get the Serbs. We have not initiated a single process of disintegration. That has been done by others, and after that we merely gathered together our pieces and attempted to turn them into a whole. That has been the case in the spiritual, political, and cultural sphere. It probably will be that way in the governmental sphere as well.

[Vujasinovic] Will it be possible to divide up Bosnia peacefully?

[Karadzic] Let that be decided by those who commence to divide it up. Bosnia can be divided up only if someone decides to leave Yugoslavia. The Republic of Bosnia did not exist at the time when Yugoslavia came into being. It is an invention of Broz and his oligarchy, of those who

turned a state which made good geopolitical sense, a unitary monarchy such as it was at the beginning, into a bastard form of state that was neither a federation nor a confederation, with no other intention than to carry out the secession of Slovenia and Croatia.

Accordingly, war will start here only if someone attempts to force the Serbs to do something they do not want to do. We will not initiate a war, nor will we force anyone to do anything. The same thing happened in Croatia. They all talk about barricades, but they do not have the honesty to say that there would have been no barricades if they had not come in personnel carriers. If someone tries to impose his will on the Serbian part of Bosnia-Hercegovina—because we have already agreed that there exists a Serbian, Croat, and Muslim Bosnia-Hercegovina, as it was conceived in some ideal sense by ZAVNOBiH [Regional Antifascist Council of the National Liberation of Bosnia-Hercegovina]—then there will be a war that will be a defensive war for us, as in fact all previous ones have been.

[Vujasinovic] What will happen if Europe persists in its intention to rid itself of Yugoslavia?

[Karadzic] Europe does not have the right to impose a solution on us. It also cannot abolish Yugoslavia, because it did not create it. It can only force Yugoslavia to respect those international standards which it has signed, and, if it does not respect them, to exert pressure in the political and economic sphere. The first documents of The Hague conference state that they will leave it to the peoples of Yugoslavia to find a solution for themselves. They will have to stick by that. Otherwise, the people, above all the Serbs, will remind them of it.

[Vujasinovic] In what way?

[Karadzic] By ignoring their decisions, because Europe does not have the right to make decisions concerning our behavior and our life.

[Vujasinovic] By proclaiming Bosnia-Hercegovina's neutrality, Alija Izetbegovic acquired the image of a peacemaker, but the SDS has challenged his right to make such a decision. Why?

[Karadzic] The neutrality of Bosnia-Hercegovina as an integral part of Yugoslavia cannot be proclaimed, because it is not independent, and an internationally recognized state cannot be neutral while the country of which it is a part is at war. We can accept the view of Mr. Izetbegovic to the effect that the Muslim nationality is neutral in the Serb-Croat conflict. Unfortunately, even now a large number of Muslims has gone over to the Croat side, just as in World War II.

Three Months Without Slobodan Milosevic

[Vujasinovic] From the very beginning, you have been put into contact with Mr. Milosevic and referred to as his branch office. What are your ties with the president of Serbia?

[Karadzic] I must tell you that that kind of interpretation is shameful. While the HDZ of Bosnia-Hercegovina was an organ pure and simple of the party of the same name in Croatia, for three entire months after our formation we had no ties with the SPS [Socialist Party of Serbia], nor even with Mr. Milosevic, because I did not want to make contact until I saw whether we had a party and whether we represented anyone in Bosnia-Hercegovina. We do not have exaggerated ties with the parties in Serbia for the simple reason that we do not want to contribute to divisions within the Serbian people.

As far as my personal or official contacts with Mr. Milosevic are concerned, they are regular, sometimes daily, over the telephone.... I have the highest opinion of Mr. Milosevic. I have become quite convinced of his abilities and moral qualities. I am not familiar enough with his closest collaborators and personnel choices around him. I think that the Serbian people has the right leader in these difficult times. The Serbian people is a neglected people, a people that does not recognize its own values, a people laboring under a Herostratus curse to attack itself and hamper itself in the most difficult moments. This does not mean that there should not be an opposition in Serbia. It is strong in Serbia and truly is not faking democracy, but is indeed too fierce. That is to Serbia's honor. Were I the opposition in Serbia, I would distinguish in the behavior of the government and the president what they do well from what they do poorly in order to strengthen them in the former and weaken them in the latter.

[Vujasinovic] Now that you have mentioned Milosevic and your telephone conversations, we have recently had occasion to read the transcripts of some of them concerning the RAM Plan for the creation of an expanded Serbia.

[Karadzic] I believe that a great Serbia is cherished in the heart of every Serb, that is, Serbia as a state of the Serbian people that would embrace all of our cultural and ethnic space. But we, like all the other serious Serbian parties, have renounced such demands so as not to hinder those who want to live with us in a common state. The RAM Plan, however, is a great fabrication. Do you think that the president of Serbia would talk about secret plans over the telephone when I have known that my phone was being bugged since back in 1968? The RAM Plan does not exist, but what does exist is a faked tape of segments from our telephone conversations.

[Vujasinovic] Have you then done something on this issue?

[Karadzic] What are we to do in a land of lawlessness, crime, and political terror? We have only taken notice of what we already knew, that they are bugging us, but we did not believe that they would admit it in public.

Bogicevic Does Not Even Represent Bogic

[Vujasinovic] An entire muddle was created over who officially represents the Serbian people in Bosnia-Hercegovina. When someone had to go to The Hague, Voja Kupresanin authorized Babic to represent the interests of Bosanska Krajina. Then Vice President Brdjanin spoke up and announced that Babic had the right only to pass on information, but not to represent the Krajina. Bozidar Vucurevic is also operating on his own. And then there is you and Bogic Bogicevic....

[Karadzic] There are no dilemmas here at all. Kupresanin represents the Krajina, Vucurevic the SAO Eastern Hercegovina. I am the president of the SDS, a political party. And I can tell you that in times better for the Serbian people, I would never be involved in politics, because I am a physician quite content with his profession, a writer, and in private life a very happy man. I would never change the calling of psychiatrist, therapeutist, group analyst for the job of a man in power. But sometimes priorities override preferences.

Milan Babic was in The Hague and he was authorized to report on the situation in Bosnia-Hercegovina, because Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Silajdzic were passing on the positions of the Muslim and possibly Croat people as though they were the unified positions of all three nationalities in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Accordingly, we will call upon every Serb in The Hague to represent us until we are in a position to have our own representative. As far as Mr. Bogicevic is concerned, he no longer represents even himself. He was elected by the communist power, and there has been speculation concerning the legitimacy of his election itself. In any case, he does not represent the Serbs. He has assured us that he is not violating the Constitution and that he is not to blame for decisions adopted to the detriment of the Serbian people. However, he has violated the Constitution flagrantly, because it is his obligation to sit in the Presidency and with every effort to oppose the destruction of Yugoslavia. His absence from the Presidency is a direct contribution to the destruction of Yugoslavia.

[Vujasinovic] There is uncertainty over what the objectives of the Army are, and it is being called upon to define them clearly. What do you think about that?

[Karadzic] The Army ought to defend the integrity of Yugoslavia. It was painfully betrayed and attacked in Slovenia, from which it withdrew, because it was proclaimed an occupying army. It seems to me that its withdrawal contributed to calming down the situation in that republic, because at that time there were many traitors in the Army and in the government. It seems to me that now the Army could stay in Slovenia, but the question is whether it should stay in places where people do not want it? At this point, the Army should prevent a further solution of the crisis in Yugoslavia by forcible means, should prevent genocide.

Academy of Sciences Appeals for Peace

92BA0239A Belgrade VREME in Serbo-Croatian 25 Nov 91 pp 10-13

[Article by Milan Milosevic: "The Voice From the House of the Spirit"]

[Text] Last week, Belgrade newspapers carried the text which follows: "The war which is taking place on the soil of the Yugoslav lands is every day taking away young lives, destroying property and nature, inflicting irreparable damage on the souls of our people. War can contribute only to deeper misunderstanding among peoples, and it is destroying our prestige in the eyes of the international public. Our democratic and economic development has been brought to a halt by the warfare, the war is having a negative political impact on other neighboring peoples as well, and we will all suffer for that.

"If the objectives of those who commenced the war are not altogether clear even today, the consequences of it are becoming clearer and clearer. As far as Serbia is concerned, the achievements of the war so far are these: The economy is ruined; the victims of violence and injustice have become known in the civilized world as conquerors and bolsheviks; for the first time in its history, Serbia does not have a single ally; great confusion—ethnic, social, and moral—which will be difficult to repair; the sudden promotion of aggressive individuals to be national leaders and war heroes; an armed underground has emerged onto the streets of the cities; and—the most horrible of all the consequences of warfare—hundreds, thousands of dead and mutilated, most of whom did not know why they died or in the name of what they were mutilated.

"We do not believe that this war serves a purpose. We do not believe in those who are waging it. We do not believe in those who are consciously or unconsciously encouraging it. We do not believe in victories that lead to new wars.

"We believe that in the very near future a peaceful solution must be found to conflicts which are now occurring and a permanent and guaranteed peace must ensue in which ethnic, political, or religious groups will not be persecuted or disenfranchised, in which a propaganda of death will not prevail, and whose time will belong to the desires and ideals of young people."

The signatories of this appeal are the following members of the Serbian Academy of Sciences: Radoslav Andjus, Ivan Antic, Milutin Garasanin, Miroslav Gasic, Miodrag Pavlovic, Predrag Palavestra, Miroslav Pantic, Borislav Pekic, Branko Popovic, Stanojlo Rajacic, Budimir Reljic, Slobodan Selenic, Miroslav Simic, Ljubomir Simovic, Mladen Srbinovic, Dragoslav Srejovic, Dimitrije Stefanovic, and Nikola Tasic. This protest of conscience appeared in a week when the militant current at Belgrade University came out with the demand that the university be closed down and a general mobilization be conducted,

in a month in which the Writers Association refused to come out against the war, and when the leadership of the SANU [Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts] declared that condemnation of the war was an individual matter for its members. That position was repeated by Dejan Medakovic, general secretary of the SANU, who informed the republic that the presidency of the academy had not been informed, although its signatories include four of its members, which, Medakovic says, is proof that this institution is "deeply imbued with democratic spirit and behavior."

The Sign of a Change of Mood

The voice of members of the Serbian academy against the war is certainly yet another sign of a change in the political mood in Serbia, which was shocked by the extent of the devastation in Vukovar, by the massacres in that unhappy city, and by the amount of violence and irrationality which this war has unleashed. However late it might be, it is a sign that people are becoming aware that the Serb-Croat war leads even the Serbian side to ruin, that its bestiality and its mistakes are even now equal to a national disaster, and that the policy which led to it cannot be altered, but must be radically abandoned.

Cvijic Recalled

It is a question, however, whether this is only Milosevic's policy. Vasa Cubrilovic, member of the academy, said in connection with the affair of the so-called SANU Memorandum that in the academy in recent years "there has been a growing tendency of its members to become involved in the difficult discussions of many problems of our Yugoslav community, that issues of very delicate importance not only from a scientific, but also from a political viewpoint are being discussed in various committees," and that he was against that. Cubrilovic recalled that Jovan Cvijic envisaged crises that would occur after the creation of Yugoslavia, that he knew what brought the Yugoslav peoples together and what divided them; however, neither he nor Stojan Novakovic, nor Jovan Zujovic, nor Ljuba Stojanovic, ever mixed the great scientific institutions in which they worked—the academy and the university, into their political activity. When they became involved in politics, they did so as individuals.

He tried to dissuade his colleagues from turning the academy into a direct protector of the individual interests of the Serbian people. He felt that academy members should take positions on delicate public problems, but on their own personal responsibility.

That voice was not heeded at that time; events took a different course (Pasic would have said "took another direction"). The Serbian Academy of Sciences (a scientific institution of the highest rank), was for that matter legitimized as a political institution (protector of Serbism). The petition of 2,011 Kosovo Serbs which five years ago was sent to the Serbian Academy of Sciences is one of the striking examples (a later petition contained over 100,000 signatures).

Finally Serbophobia

The academy's Committee for Investigation of Genocide broke the silence, and it probably contributed to enlivening the trauma of war and the reawakening of mass fear. The road to revanchism was paved by others. Although in this regard members of the church were more active and exclusive, many members of the most influential Serbian cultural and scientific institutions were fervent and quick to assume the risk that comes from digging up graves.

During the debate of "Serbophobia" (9 January 1989 at Francuska 7), Mica Popovic, member of the academy, summed up that attitude in the exclamation: "And finally Serbophobia." To be sure, he recommends "emotional indifference" to Serbophobia (which no one has heeded), but also "taking off the wall landscapes with scenes from Hieronymus Bosch, with willows from which Serbs are hanging, framed in the goal of brotherhood and unity" (which all heeded, rejecting not only that motto, but also the one from before the war, "My brother is dear to me, whatever faith he may be"). Vasilje Krestic, member of the academy, and certain other experts were constant guests of the media on the topic of genocide committed against the Serbs.

The topic of the genocide that occurred 50 years ago, with the overtone "and is now being repeated," has become the main war slogan and has been exploited as the main political argument in the media with the arrogant irresponsibility of the ignorant. The appeal against the war that comes from that environment could also have been the result of the awareness that the hastily conceived concept of protecting the Serbs is worse than disastrous: half a million Serbs and Croats resettled, thousands massacred, several cities destroyed in which both Serbs and Croats live, hundreds of emptied villages, with Vukovar as the painful stamp on this terrible mistake. An attempt to change the historical balance is now being referred to as an effort to build Mount Prokletije in Slavonia.

Nor is recollection of genocide the only thesis which has been taken over from scholarly journalism and simplified for daily use in war propaganda. The thesis that the Serbs are losing the war because of conspirators in the Western media has been taken over and translated to the present time from the book by Veselin Djuretic, *Saveznici i jugoslovenska ratna drama* [*The Allies and the Drama of the War in Yugoslavia*], a controversial book of which the academy was one of the publishers and which stirred up the political public six years ago.

"Golden Years"

The SANU Memorandum, which five years ago was stolen before it was completed, is looked on as some kind

of new Nacertanije, although it did not have the dimensions of the Nacertanije, nor did it attain the level of that understanding of the times—nor did it accurately define Yugoslav and Serb problems, nor did it indicate changes in the East. It is that unfinished document, as time has been showing, that reveals the key crisis of the political concept in Serbia. Had it not been stolen and published at the moment when it was only a pile of proposals, there is some question of whether that "nostalgic" document could have been turned into anything more consistent.

At first glance, the Memorandum disputed the feudalization of Yugoslav space that was occurring at that time and pleaded for a democratic federation, but many consider it a document which signified the end of the Serbian political advocacy of Yugoslavia, which cannot be explicitly found anywhere in that document that dates from 1986. Key parts of that document were inspired by a certain enthusiasm for a mixed economy with state planning and a market and for protection of the socialized economy, that is, for the period before 1965, when some of the influential members of the academy were in power. The economic section of the Memorandum says that the highest growth rates were achieved in that period, which was a way of neutralizing the Yugoslav "profiteering" school of economic thought. It is interesting that even General Kadijevic today refers to the sixties as a time when Yugoslavia was "intact."

Vacillation

The academy members hoped that Milosevic would write off his nearest collaborators who had been ideological inquisitors by task or by temperament. At the moment when Milosevic came to power, in the fall of 1987, Cosic, who had the most to say in the discussion with the Slovenes within the framework of the PEN club and was scolding Miodrag Bulatovic for talking with the guests in an uncivilized way, was criticizing "those in the Belgrade 'skyscraper' who want to turn Serbia into a Stalinist Vendee and want to stifle what little journalistic freedom there is." The Slovenes did not understand Cosic's intention of putting together a coalition with the liberalism there, perhaps too much of their inspiration was ethnic and they were constantly frustrated by attacks from Belgrade "officialdom."

In the meantime, the intellectual elite in Belgrade was not trying to stop Milosevic's power, which had quickly severed Yugoslav ties and wherever and whenever it could had aggravated relations with the Slovenes and Croats (the series of "lambadas," the series of blockades). Some did not conceal their enjoyment of this.

Officially, nevertheless, the cultural elite in Belgrade did hold to Serbian yugoslavism for a long time and seemingly out of conviction (Serbian yugoslavism was like a red kerchief to the Croat side). Talk about the division of languages and the Treaty of Vienna and the Novi Sad Agreement as a "rotten compromise" had nothing to do with the academy's Language Institute, which, by contrast with Brozovic, continues to take the position that Serbo-Croatian is a single language. That is a product of the climate which prevails in 1991 in the Serbian Assembly, in which no one any longer pays any attention to what anyone says.

Abandonment of Yugoslavia

Sometime after the Memorandum, it was Vlado Strugar, member of the academy, who first uttered the phrase "third Yugoslavia," which shocked many people, but still did not explain anything. The idea of abandoning Cvijic's legacy became obvious a bit later, inevitably accompanied by cartographic inspiration.

Only in the fall of 1988 did Cosic speak from the tribune of KNJIZEVNE NOVINE about Yugoslavia as a "country of betrayed expectations and an uncertain future." In that context, he said that those peoples which had gained the most were the most dissatisfied with Yugoslavia and that it was most difficult in Yugoslavia for the most numerous nationality. He arrived in Montenegro ahead of Milosevic in the spring of 1989, and in a speech in Budva he called upon the Montenegrins to take a position on whether "ethnocide" had been practiced against them.

The removal of the adjective "Yugoslav" from the name of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts made it evident that the Croats had gone the same road, erasing their native yugoslavism. Both sides displayed the joy of Herostratus and certain Croat "Yugoslavs" were attacked more than the Croat rightwingers in Belgrade newspapers.

The Serbs in Croatia

The 1986 SANU Memorandum formulated the demand that the balance of power in Yugoslavia be changed to the advantage of the Serbs, who had been pushed down. The issue of the position of the Serbs in Croatia, of their rights and their institutions, was raised directly and to the fullest. Certain kinds of similar studies were done even in the League of Communists of Serbia at that time, for example, analyses of the economic lag of Serbia or arguments concerning the name given to the language in the Croatian Constitution. The political power in Serbia at the time considered the Memorandum the platform of Serbian nationalism, and, which it did not acknowledge in public, some kind of revelation of its own sensitive political intention, which the principal actors believed that they could achieve if they moved cautiously. The theft of the Memorandum is therefore attributed to some of Dolanc's people.

In Serbian political practice, "way back when," there was the "love and hate" phenomenon between the "partyocracy" and the "patriarchate," between the government and the opposition, which was institutionalized in the academy. The more cautious politicians nevertheless adhered to the motto that there were three institutions in Serbia it was not healthy to attack: the patriarchate, the academy, and the "Red Star" soccer team. In any case, the government was more afraid of the

academy than the other way around, although ideological campaigns and labels must have had a very painful impact on the members of the academy.

It will be evident that precisely that paradox perhaps brought about the crisis of the Serbian political concept. It was not nice to reproach the academy, that was the civil order, and the attacks were mainly decided upon either by the party ideologues, who were disqualified by their political position, or those designated by the government, that is, the aggressive and incompetent. Because this was an extremely unpleasant task, many members of the present regime, being "men for all times," did that "dirty job" mainly by stringing together bad names.

The result of all this was the absence of relevant criticism, which had far-reaching consequences: No one figured out the future (in spite of the project entitled "Third Millennium," whose buildings were conceived on the land of the present Belgrade Railroad Station and then beyond, on the other side of the Sava, and in spite of the "Science and Technology Park" on Zvezdara which the "Eightist" activist Drasko Milicevic, an engineer, made much of in a time when promises were given without much thought).

Breakups

One constant that has been a feature of the spiritual climate in Serbia in recent years is a series of discontinuities: Parallel to internationalism was the abandonment of Cvijic's yugoslavism, europeanism was abandoned, and a revulsion toward modernism and technical progress was displayed, some influential people equating them with the bombs dropped on Belgrade in 1941 and 1943. "Europeanization" could threaten many "bigwigs," reveal many mistakes and failures, and so it was safer to yield to the small-town mentality. "Responses and reactions" from cramped perspectives were described even by certain intelligent people as "strong and critical public opinion." That is how we arrived at the "fascism of small nations." With the strengthening of authoritarian power in recent years and the increasing strain in political relations with all countries in the world, even that slender tie with the world was severed. The intellectual elite, and indeed the technocratic stratum as well, did not endeavor to persuade Milosevic to avoid a conflict with the world and to speed up the modernization of society, although for a time he boasted of such intentions through his Reform Commission.

A fawning support of the government was produced at the university, perhaps even because Milosevic, through the "integral Marxists," had one of his strongest points of support at the university. The support which the academicians gave to the Serbian regime was not, however, the result of fawning, although there was also that, but, as far as the principal figures are concerned, of calculation. "He is working for us."

He "quietly" rejoiced when he managed to win them over, and, practically without asking anyone for anything, pretended that he would be an enlightened absolutist, which the elites of small nations rather like. They did not come to their senses when this began to have consequences which they, as the source of inspiration, should have taken into account.

Now that we have waded deep into the disaster, that unsigned compact is perhaps beginning to be dissolved. The appeal to stop the war is an attempt to take back the blank check which was presented to Milosevic with almost puerile naivete.

The Most Popular Serb

Milosevic, who took power with the help of "military apostasy," sat comfortably in his office only when the academicians began to praise him. Two years ago, Dobrica Cosic called Milosevic "the most popular Serb in the 20th century," later adding, without correcting himself, that he is operating under more difficult conditions than Pasic. Mihajlo Markovic, a member of the academy, is even today using his calling as a philosopher as current coin in explaining the policy of the Socialist Party and glorifying the credit due him in bringing the academy closer to Milosevic (he certainly deserves more than Isakovic).

At the time when the constitutional amendments were being debated, in October 1988, Mihajlo Markovic proclaimed the emergence in Serbia of "a new type of young political leaders who have been intelligent enough to realize that without popular support they can no longer survive in politics," that "the people has again become a protagonist of history," and he praised the "impressive self-organization, spontaneous initiative, and self-discipline."

On the basis of those prerequisites, it should become a model of democracy ("not Slovenia, but Serbia"). "Of nonpluralistic democracy," if memory serves us. Miroslav Pantic, member of the academy, spoke at a gathering dedicated to Vuk Karadzic in Trsic about "unification of a shattered and hobbled Serbia." Milosevic appeared to Serbia's intellectual elite to be like a gift from heaven, a leader who would restore the ideals many of them held. It is not altogether clear at this point whether some of them counted even on war as a means of achieving those political objectives, although it is certain that many of them were backers of maximum intensification. Incidentally, "treasonous pacifism" was condemned even this summer in one of Cosic's interviews. Milos Macura, member of the academy, approved unarmed forms of violence in Knin Krajina a few months ago, before the war flared up. At that time, this was still referred to as the "log revolution." That entire prehistory does not diminish the importance of the gesture of conscience on the part of the group of members of the academy. However, this is not enough, because Serbia needs a new political platform. The question is whether the Serbian cultural elite, which

largely is inspired by pronounced nationalism, is intellectually and psychologically ready for the great undertaking of defining a political concept for Serbia in the context of the Yugoslav disaster?

So long as the war lasts, so long as institutions are inoperative, so long as Serbia is isolated from the world, and the destiny of the nation is governed by irresponsible people—that is something truly difficult.

Bosnia-Hercegovina

Muslim, Croat Representatives Fail To Join Talks

AU2612173491 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Negotiations between the three national communities of Bosnia-Hercegovina have not been continued in Sarajevo. Representatives of the Muslim and Croatian peoples have not appeared at the scheduled time. Here is a report by Ljubomir Nikolic:

[Nikolic] Representatives of the Croatian Democratic Community have called off their participation in today's talks because of Christmas holidays, and the Party of Democratic Action has not explained its failure to attend the continuation of the negotiations. Instead of the talks, representatives of the Serbian people held a news conference at which they said that only one meeting has been held so far at which the three sides offered their own solutions to the political crisis in Bosnia-Hercegovina in writing.

The talks have already encountered difficulties in their early stage. The Serbs insists on the fact that the talks should be held between the three national communities and allow the possibility of their being joined by representatives of other parties in the parliament, as well as foreign experts. On the other hand, the Party of Democratic Action and the Croatian Democratic Community demand that the talks be held between representatives of the three national parties.

Concerning the solutions offered, the Serbian side suggested two variants: the Belgrade initiative or a (?complex) Bosnia-Hercegovina in which each people would have its own autonomy and would connect itself to the state community according to its own will—firmly or loosely. This variant was forced after the Party of Democratic Action and Croatian Democratic Community demanded that Europe recognize the independence of the republic, Momcilo Krajisnik, president of the Republican Assembly said today.

Regarding the Party of Democratic Action, it was said that it accepts all solutions, even the transformation of Bosnia-Hercegovina, if this does not affect the republic's sovereignty, while the Croatian Democratic Community above all demands a peaceful solution to the crisis.

It is not yet known whether the talks between the representatives of the three peoples of Bosnia-Hercegovina will continue and if so, when that will be, but it is completely certain that prolonging them only increases tension and strain in this republic. One has the impression that everybody here is waiting for the EC to reply to the demand of the incomplete Presidency and Government of Bosnia-Hercegovina to recognize this republic's independence.

Muslim Party Accepts SDS Call for Talks

LD2612214291 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2045 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Sarajevo, December 26 (TANJUG)—The Party of Democratic Action (SDA), which rallies Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina, tonight said it accepted the call of the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS) for the continuation of talks on the political future of this Yugoslav republic.

Today's talks between officials of three national communities in Bosnia-Hercegovina—Serbs, Muslims and Croats—were not held since the Muslim and Croatian representatives did not show up.

The SDS, which launched the negotiations, told journalists that the Croatian side said it could not come because of the Christmas holidays.

An SDA statement said that the republican parliament was solely authorized to decide on the political future of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

However, Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina are dissatisfied with the decision of the Moslem and Croatian deputies to ask the European Community to recognize the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina and said they would declare a Republic of the Serbian People of Bosnia-Hercegovina on January 14, unless an agreement between the three constitutive nations is not reached by then.

Belgrade Paper Warns of Republic's Break-Up

LD2512120391 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1127 GMT 25 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 25 (TANJUG)—The Belgrade daily VECERNJE NOVOSTI today warns that there is a danger of the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Hercegovina breaking up and says that "this looks much more likely to happen than recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina as an independent state."

"In the present conditions, any break-up would mean war in Bosnia-Hercegovina" says the paper and adds that it is beyond all doubt that compromise alone between the ruling parties can help preserve peace.

VECERNJE NOVOSTI explains that the Muslim Democratic Action Party (SDA) expects from Europe and the world to present it with an independent state of Bosnia-Hercegovina, while the Serbian Democratic Party (SDS)

would not agree at any cost to a separation of Bosnia-Hercegovina from the rest of Yugoslavia and is preparing for decisive action. The Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) is sitting on the fence and judging the chances of throwing its lot in with the winner, says the paper.

The Bosnia-Hercegovina leadership has applied to the European Community for international recognition. The SDS has threatened to declare a republic in the territories where Serbs constitute the majority population which will remain in Yugoslavia.

Bosnia-Hercegovina's population is 44 per cent Muslim, 31 per cent Serb and 17 per cent Croat. The republic is ruled by a coalition of three national parties—the SDA, the SDS and the HDZ.

Prospects of Izetbegovic's Reelection Viewed

92BA0260B Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 15 Dec 91 p 6

[Article by M. Duric: "Will Izetbegovic Remain?"]

[Text] Sarajevo, 14 Dec—In coming days in Bosnia-Hercegovina, a problem should be solved whose solution is for the present not being hinted at even by the principals involved. Alija Izetbegovic, Fikret Abdic, and Dr. Ejup Ganic have not said anything specific about who will be president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency. As is well-known, the one-year term of office of the incumbent president of the Presidency expires on 20 December. Seven members of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency will decide whether Izetbegovic will continue the job he has begun or will be replaced by someone else.

In the First Congress of the SDA [Democratic Action Party], Izetbegovic confirmed the reputation which he enjoys with the Muslim people, if the votes of the Muslim delegates are a reliable indication. The candidates who opposed Izetbegovic received a token number of votes, and Alija Izetbegovic actually did not have any real rival. One can only guess how the voting would have gone if Omer Behmen, say, or Salem Sabic, or Hasan Cengic, perhaps, had been nominated. They also enjoy a reputation, and they have influence among Muslims.

How Will the Presidency Vote?

They, however, have directed their influence toward Izetbegovic's advancement, and they are preserving their own powerful position out of the limelight. It is from there that they have exerted their influence even on the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency, where Izetbegovic, although "first among equals," undoubtedly was the main figure. Taking up once again the role of party leader, Izetbegovic at the same time jeopardized his office of leader in the republic. Not, of course, because he personally would not be able to perform both functions at the same time, as in fact he has up to now. Especially because the separation of offices has been going rather slowly for some of the new leaders in Bosnia-Hercegovina. Alija Izetbegovic is not the only party leader in the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency. Stjepan Kljuic is also a member of the Presidency and also the leader of the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community] in Bosnia-Hercegovina. (Up to now, only Dr. Radovan Karadzic has not displayed a passion to accumulate offices.)

How, then, will the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency vote? It is a question of the present moment, the count has already begun. When that question is raised in the Presidency in a few days, Stjepan Kljuic, member of the Presidium and president of the HDZ of Bosnia-Hercegovina, will certainly not stand in the way of the SDA president, whom he managed to charm even earlier, and now he will assure him once again that he is loyal and that the coalition of the SDA and HDZ can be extended. Regardless of the possible signs of split because of the formation of "Herceg-Bosnia," of which the SDA and HDZ take different views.

Franjo Borac, the second man in the HDZ, by contrast with Kljuic, has shown himself to be more moderate and wise. His vote could in fact be decisive because what Dr. Nikola Koljevic and Dr. Biljana Plavsic think about Alija Izetbegovic's leadership of Bosnia is well-known.

If anyone will be the first to vote for Izetbegovic, then it will be, as it has been up to now, Fikret Abdic. In order to allay speculation, Abdic has already confirmed this in a brief statement. At the same time, at this moment Abdic may also be a most serious candidate for president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency. Two weeks have passed, and it would really have been interesting to see what would happen if by some chance Abdic were nominated for president of the SDA in the congress.

But that has come and gone. However, if one is to judge by the votes which he received in the first round of the election, Abdic is still the leader for a majority of Muslims. Preoccupied with the economy, and above all with his own "Agrokomerc," Abdic does not want positions of leadership.

Will it be left, then, to Alija to be "everything," which is something that Abdic personally did dispute in the First Congress of the SDA?

When asked whether Abdic could be president of the Presidency, Alija Izetbegovic replied: Why not?

A Shadow of Clericalism Over Bosnia

The apparent or real graciousness of the principal candidates toward one another may also be interpreted as a certain coyness with an important office, the leadership of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency. Alija Izetbegovic is quite familiar with that position, he is aware that if he does not remain in the office, he will have less chance to achieve the ideas coming from the headquarters of the SDA.

It turns out that the simplest thing would be to extend Izetbegovic's tenure even though this is questionable from certain angles. The greatest fault attributed to Izetbegovic is the influence which the clerical current in the SDA has over him, and that strong wing is likewise an obstacle for Abdic. For his part, Izetbegovic does not see the existence of a strong clerical current, but denies it. Up to now, Abdic has always spoken out freely, and that is his advantage.

As is usually the case, there is also a third man: Dr. Ejup Ganic. In a way, he has already been promoted to deputy and heir to Alija Izetbegovic, even though he has not declared himself to be a Muslim, but a Yugoslav, but in the meantime he has acted the other way about, and, with the election of the president of the Bosnia-Hercegovina Presidency an open question, it is better that he not be impatient.

Macedonia

Court Backs EC-Requested Constitutional Changes

LD2612142791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1336 GMT 26 Dec 91

[Text] Skopje, 26 Dec (TANJUG)—Prior to a session of the Macedonian Assembly today the Constitutional Commission supported a government proposal to change the Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia. This move comes in order to provide additional constitutional guarantees which the European Community has requested as a condition for international recognition.

These amendments constitutionally and legally confirm that the Republic of Macedonia has no territorial pretensions toward neighboring countries. It was emphasized that this means that they confirm Macedonia's stand that the present borders can be changed only in accordance with the constitution and with generally accepted international norms based on principles of good will.

The proposed draft amendments represent a constitutional guarantee that Macedonia will not interfere in the sovereign rights of other states. It also has application to policy regarding rights of members of the Macedonian nation in neighboring countries and emigrants from Macedonia.

Albanians Claim Violation of Ethnic Rights

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[Text] Macedonia does not meet the criteria for international recognition because the ethnic rights of Albanians are threatened there. This is stressed in a statement of the Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity and the National Democratic Party, in which they also demand a referendum and political autonomy for Albanians. Boris Djordjioski reports from Skopje:

[Begin Djordjioski recording] Macedonia does not meet the criteria for international recognition because the ethnic rights of Albanians are threatened there. This was pointed out today in a statement, which resembles an ultimatum, that was sent to all European institutions, the UN, the Albanian president, and the president of the so-called government of the Republic of Kosovo. The statement is signed by the Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity and the National Democratic Party. The Albanians in Macedonia, the statement continues, form 40 percent of the population. They are a homogeneous unit and have nothing in common with the Slavic elements. They are asking that the EC request that Macedonia endorse a constitutional law by which a full ethnic equality of Albanians would be achieved. The constitutional law should be adopted before 15 January. They also demand that the EC guarantee them the holding of a referendum at which Albanians would express their political will and in this way obtain a special status, that is to say, political and territorial autonomy. With the new Constitution, for which the Albanian deputies in the Assembly did not vote, Albanians were ghettoized, the statement says. All their rights were denied, for example, the right to education in their mother tongue at all levels, they were prohibited from using their national symbols, there is discrimination against the Albanian language, and the national hegemony of the Macedonians in the Assembly. All this, the leaders of the Albanian Party of Democratic Prosperity and the National Democratic Party think, are sufficient reasons for Macedonia not to be internationally recognized. They were, as they say, also against the referendum on Macedonia's independence because they realized that a national Macedonian state is being formed with it. For the same reason they were also against the Constitution and the national census. They demand a new census under the supervision of the UN or CSCE. The model of Bosnia-Hercegovina's constitution is more acceptable for the Albanians in Macedonia, according to which they would no longer be a minority but a nation in Macedonia. We have to remind people here that the deputies of Albanian parties in the Assembly voted in favor of the declaration by which international recognition of Macedonia was requested, but their parties, whose word counts more than that of individuals, obviously do not think the same way. [end recording]